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DECONSTRUCTING THE POLITICS OF BEING YELLOW
By LeeAnn O’Neill*

I

like to stop by the office of my favorite undergraduate professor at the George Washington University, a Japanese
American professor of Japanese Language and Literature
with strong opinions on just about everything. Sometimes we
talk about the things we could not talk about when he was my
professor; other times, we simply talk. This time, we discussed
why he thought Asian Americans were so politically inactive,
especially given their seemingly advantageous position in society. Our consensus was that Latinos have found an identity unifying multiple ethnic groups, otherwise known as a pan-ethnic
identity, that Asian Americans have not. I originally stopped by
his office with the intention of soliciting an article on this very
topic from him. Instead, he challenged me to write this article
myself.
A couple weeks later, I was drinking coffee with one of my
more politically savvy friends, a prominent Chinese American K
Street attorney. Recalling my conversation with my professor, I
asked him who some of the prominent Latinos are in politics that
he could think of off the top of his head.1 He swiftly replied Alberto Gonzales, Antonio Villaraigosa, Mel Martinez, Anthony
Romero, and Bill Richardson.2 Then I asked him the same thing
about prominent Asian Americans in politics.3 I was stunned to
hear his answer –“Norman Mineta, that Hawaiian guy…does
Connie Chung count?”4 It was at that moment I knew this article
would come to fruition.

social and political constructs against mainstream America.
This essay argues that although mainstream America views
Asian Americans as a pan-ethnic political unit, in reality, there is
no viable Asian American political identity today.11 Why could
Latinos use this construct to create a secondary identity outside
of their ethnicity and establish a political coalition? In contrast,
why did Asian Americans rebuff this racial construct? This essay attempts to illustrate why the politics of being Asian American has failed in comparison to the relatively successful politics
of being Latino. Acknowledging the importance of the social
aspect of pan-ethnic identity, the scope of this essay specifically
focuses on political manifestations against or in support of racial
constructions.

INTRODUCTION

THE ORIGINS OF THE LATINO POLITICAL IDENTITY:
THE CASE OF CHICAGO AND THE UNLIKELY POLITICAL
UNION BETWEEN MEXICAN AMERICANS AND
PUERTO RICANS

The 2000 census reported that at 12.6% of the total population, Latinos outnumbered African Americans as the largest minority group in the United States. Asian Americans numbered
only 3.6%.5 In 2003, however, Asian Americans had the highest
median income of any racial group, including Caucasians, at
$63,251.6 Conversely, Latinos tied African Americans for the
lowest median income at $34,272.7 Given Asian Americans’
history of disenfranchisement, continued discrimination by mainstream America, and vast potential economic power, why has
there been such little political coalition building among Asian
Americans? Why have Latinos, with a similar history of disenfranchisement and discrimination, successfully banded together
politically to bring many Latino political figures to prominence?
Critical race theorists argue that race is a social and legal
construction, a political device to keep people of color subordinated beneath mainstream America.8 Race refers to a “vast
group of people loosely bound together by historically contingent, socially significant elements of their […] ancestry.” Race
should be understood as a unique social phenomenon that connects physical features to the essence of a social group.9 As
such, mainstream America replaces ethnic identity with broad
labels such as Latino and Asian American.10 Consequently, socalled racial groups like Latinos and Asian Americans exist as
Spring 2006

THE FACTORS THAT FUEL PAN-ETHNIC POLITICAL
IDENTITIY
General coalition building requires that a group consist of
like-minded people whose backgrounds, experiences, or positions in the social structure make them receptive to the ideas of a
new political movement.12 Pan-ethnic political group identity,
however, has two separate sources for coalition-building: (1)
physical characteristics which induce mainstream America to
treat members of separate ethnicities the same, transcending ethnicity or nationality and (2) social characteristics such as language, education discrimination, and job discrimination.13

“Mexicans see Puerto Ricans as U.S. Citizens who come to this
country with a lot of privileges and we don’t take advantage of
those privileges.”14
– Interview with Puerto Rican in Chicago
“The thing with Mexicans is that they know they are wetbacks.”15
– Interview with Puerto Rican in Chicago
“Mexicans don’t go on welfare; welfare is for Blacks, Americans,
and Puerto Ricans, because they’re lazy.”16
– Interview with Mexican American in Chicago

Chicago’s Latino population is dominated by two ethnic
groups: Mexican Americans, who comprise approximately 70%
of the Latino population, and Puerto Ricans, who make up approximately 15% of the Latino population.17 Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans in Chicago have a history of intense discrimination and stereotyping against each other; for example, the
Southside Mexican American stereotype versus the Humboldt
Park Puerto Rican gangster stereotype. For Chicago Latinos, a
Mexican American should never identify or associate with
3

Puerto Ricans or vice versa.18 Even semantics of language, the election news coverage, however, glossed over the importance
most apparent commonality between the two groups, was a sali- of the fact that an overwhelming 84% of registered Latinos
ent source of division. Rather than unifying Spanish speakers, it voted for Villaraigosa. The 2000 Census indicated that while
became a mechanism for self-stratification based on competing about a million Mexican Americans reside in Los Angeles, well
notions of proper upbringing and civility.19
over half a million Latinos are from other countries of origin,
Contrary to such tensions and isolation, the development making Mexican Americans 63% of Los Angeles’ Latino popuand success of a Latino coalition reflects the unified response of lation.27 For the non-Mexican American Latinos in Los AngeMexican Americans and Puerto Ricans to common discrimina- les, Villaraigosa may have been just a Latino mayoral candidate;
tion by mainstream America. The affirmative action policy that even though in the broad context of the election he was more
emerged out of the 1964 and 1968 Civil Rights Acts laid the than just that.
foundation for the formation of a panIn Villaraigosa’s failed 2001 bid
ethnic Latino political coalition.20
for mayor, he garnered nearly the
Approximately 41% of registered same percentage of the Latino vote as
Chicago corporations’ blanket job
Latino voters in the United States the 2005 election. Furthermore, in
discrimination against Mexican
indicated that they are more
2005, he generated a record voter turnAmericans and Puerto Ricans gave
out among Latinos in Los Angeles.28
birth to the Spanish Coalition for Jobs
likely to vote if there is a Latino
in the 1970s, which strove to enforce
Pre-election data reflects that a domion the ballot. Nearly a quarter
21
the affirmative action statutes.
nating 82.4% of registered Latino vot“At
of these voters would pick a Laers in Los Angeles indicated that they
the center of Latino ethnic affinity and
tino candidate even when a more would participate in the runoff elecmobilization were the structural and
tion.29 Approximately 41% of regiscircumstantial conditions of workingqualified non-Latino candidate
class solidarity” and collective opprestered Latino voters in the United
appears on the ballot.
sion.22 Under these conditions, the
States indicated that they are more
likely to vote if there is a Latino on the
political coalition in Chicago between
Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans grew to encompass ballot.30 Nearly a quarter of these voters would pick a Latino
broader issues based on their common socio-economic status candidate even when a more qualified non-Latino candidate
within the Black-White paradigm, including bilingual education appears on the ballot.31 In other words, a vast majority will vote
and work-sponsored “English as a Second Language” classes.
for a Latino candidate if running against an equally qualified
Chicago illustrates the political reaction of Mexican Ameri- non-Latino candidate.32 Consequently, the perception of Vilcans and Puerto Ricans to mainstream American discrimination laraigosa as a Latino candidate in the eyes of Latinos played a
against Latinos as a racial group. Mexican Americans and large role in the participation and voting patterns of Latinos in
Puerto Ricans found common ground in the “political ethnicity” Los Angeles.
of being Latino, “a manipulative device for the pursuit of collecJust as job discrimination became a uniting force in Chi23
tive political, economic, and social interests in society.” Job cago, the primaries indicated that Latino voters favor candidates
discrimination manifested itself as discrimination against Span- who talk about their issues and reach out to them.33 Although
ish speakers as a racial group for the corporations in Chicago. some Latino voters admitted to voting for Villaraigosa because
The common thread of speaking Spanish was not the basis of the he was “one of their own,” his platform spoke to the top three
coalition, but rather a tool for strengthening their group con- issues for Latinos - education, health care, and labor.34 Rather
sciousness.24 Thus, Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans in than focusing on his Mexican American heritage, which he
Chicago remained Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans first, wears proudly, he identified with his constituents as someone
who grew out of poverty and championed the collective sociobut together, they identified as Latino.
economic interests held by Latinos in Los Angeles.35 Instead of
THE LATINO POLITICAL IDENTITY TODAY:
using language as a basis of unity, he used it as a political tool.
THE CASE OF LOS ANGELES AND THE ELECTION OF
He appealed to the Latino vote with appearances on Univision
ANTONIO VILLARAIGOSA
and adopted Cesar Chavez’s mantra “Si, se puede,” which
36
Los Angeles is home to one of the most diverse populations means, “It can be done,” as his campaign slogan.
Villaraigosa’s victory illustrates the growth of the Latino
in the United States, with a population of 48% Latino, 31% Caucasian, 11% Asian American, and 10% African American.25 On political entity from a citywide campaign to a nationwide pheMay 17, 2005, Mexican American Antonio Villaraigosa beat nomenon. Mainstream America fears the sleeping voting superincumbent mayor James Hahn as the first Latino mayor of Los power of Latinos and Villaraigosa’s victory has heightened that
37
Angeles in over a century. Villaraigosa found broad support fear. Latinos across the nation see Villaraigosa’s victory as
across all key demographics: racial, ethnic, economic, and geo- one for Latinos, not just for Mexican Americans. His victory
graphic groups. Time Magazine hailed his election as a symbol symbolizes the new Latino political power in the Democratic
38
of “a bridge-building, post-ethnic style of politics.”26 Post- Party. The Latino political movement has turned him into a
4
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Chin had been Japanese and murdered because he was Japanese,
would Asian Americans have come together to fight the injustice of giving probation for murder? It is troubling that the political coalition of Asian Americans has weakened without an
imminent civil rights threat based on mistaken identity.
THE ORIGINS OF ASIAN AMERICAN POLITICAL
Unlike the Latinos in Chicago, Asian Americans in Detroit
DISUNITY: THE CASE OF VINCENT CHIN
found very little common political ground beyond the color of
In 1982, two Caucasian males murdered Chinese American their skin and the shape of their eyes to propel the movement
46
Vincent Chin in Detroit because he looked Japanese. At a time forward. The Immigration Act of 1965 ushered in a new genwhen Japan was a looming economic superpower, the two men eration of Asian Americans, including Chinese, Korean, Filisympathized with Congressman John Dingell’s angry speech in pino, and South Asian immigrants in Detroit. The new regulaCongress blaming “little yellow men” for the demise of Ameri- tions heavily favored educated professionals and a new Asian
American middle class composed of
can automakers and blamed Chin, as a
the children of the laundry and restauyellow man, for the loss of American
...during the World War II intern- rant owners who had completed colcar manufacturing jobs.39 The Chiment of Japanese Americans,
lege by the 1980s.47
nese American community was not
This upward movement in socionly shocked by the nature of the hate
Chinese Americans hung signs
ety removed common factors like povcrime, but by the fact that the murdersaying “This is a Chinese shop”
erty and socio-economic status as
ers only received a sentence of probaand Korean Americans hung
goals for political unity and consetion. The nation had yet to recognize
signs
claiming
that
“We
Hate
40
quently, removed factors that would
the concept of a hate crime.
help keep the ACJ a viable organizaJaps
Worse
Than
You
Do.”
Chinese American organizations
tion. Unlike Latinos, who as a group
developed the first pan-Asian political
suffer from a growing occupational
entity, the American Citizens for Justice (“ACJ”), with some support from Japanese American, Ko- divide with respect to mainstream America, Asian Americans
48
rean American, and Filipino American organizations. The ACJ have surpassed the success of mainstream America as a group.
became the first explicitly Asian American civil rights advocacy Furthermore, Asian Americans in Detroit lacked certain tools of
effort with a national scope.41 This was an ambitious attempt coalition such as the Latinos’ power as the largest minority and
given Asian Americans’ tendency to disassociate themselves their common language. Asian Americans were vastly outnumbered, comprising less than 1.5% of metropolitan Detroit’s
from harassed Asian American groups.
49
Historically, Asian Americans have only attempted to es- population.
It is worth noting that South Asian Americans were the
chew the generic yellow label. For example, during the World
largest
Asian American group in Detroit.50 Although South
War II internment of the Japanese Americans, Chinese Americans hung signs saying “This is a Chinese shop” and Korean Asian Americans supported the ACJ, they comprised a very
Americans hung signs claiming that “We Hate Japs Worse Than small part of the organization. For example, South Asian
You Do.”42 This antagonism reflected recent Chinese American Americans were not identified as participating in street demonand Korean American immigrants’ backlash against the imperi- strations, which consisted mostly of Chinese Americans, with
alist policies of Japan against China and Korea back home. some support from Korean Americans, Japanese Americans, and
51
Why? Possibly because South Asian
More recently, in the aftermath of the 1992 riots and ravaging of Filipino Americans.
Americans,
with
their
own
distinct physical characteristics, were
Koreatown in Los Angeles, there was a striking absence of other
Asian Americans during the peace march to demand the rebuild- less likely to be mistaken for Japanese. The trend towards the
ing of Koreatown.43 A Chinese American editor for the Los social construct of Asian Pacific American as a distinct group
Angeles Times voiced what no one else wanted to admit out loud from South Asian American is logical given the purpose for
– she did not march because she was afraid of being mistaken which Asian Americans created the ACJ.

tool of the movement, motivating and facilitating the advancement of other Latinos. Consequently, Villaraigosa has paved the
way for future political candidates labeled as Latinos to draw on
his success.

for Korean.44
The ACJ had only limited success and the movement in
Detroit waned. The Chin saga ended with the return of Chin’s
mother to China in 1987, disgusted with the United States legal
system for acquitting both murderers of all charges.45 The ACJ
was only successful because the Chin murder shed light on a
horrible truth; Asian Americans did not have a choice in mistaken identity. In the eyes of mainstream America, if the alleged
enemy is Korean, then all yellow people are Korean. If the alleged enemy is Japanese, then all yellow people are Japanese. If
Spring 2006

THE ASIAN AMERICAN IDENTITY TODAY:
THE CASE OF OREGON AND THE ELECTION OF
DAVID WU
The United States Senate has two Asian American Senators.
Both, unsurprisingly, are from Hawaii, the only state where
Asian Americans make up the highest proportion of the total
population.52 There are only five Asian Americans in the United
States House of Representatives.53 In 1998, David Wu became
the first Taiwan-born American elected to Congress. He was
5

sworn into his fourth term on January 4, 2005 as the Representative for Oregon. Oregon is only 2% Asian American.54
Like other Asian American political candidates, Wu
avoided playing the race card and ran on a platform appealing to
Oregon voters of all backgrounds, including education, healthcare, and social security.55 In fact, it is likely he alienated Chinese American supporters in the 2000 election when he voted
against Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China. Many
Chinese Americans voted for him in 1998 simply because he
was Chinese American and crossed party lines to do so.56 When
it became clear Wu was not a candidate for Chinese Americans,
they crossed back over the party lines during his re-election.
His campaign website mentions his ethnicity in one small paragraph at the end of his biography.57 A family photo with his
blonde, Caucasian wife is juxtaposed against this paragraph, as
if to offset the fact he is Taiwanese American.
Even more revealing is the lack of a reaction to the 1998
election. Asian Americans have not turned the election of David
Wu into a symbol of the emergence of Asian Americans in politics. The media coverage did not hail it as a new day for Asian
Americans. Chinese American voters felt that regardless of
Wu’s election, Asian Americans still lacked political clout and
that “whatever we thought, it probably didn’t make that much of
a difference.”58 Unlike Villaraigosa, who followed “the rule of
thumb for race politics” by mobilizing “his people” and swinging enough votes among “other people,” Wu was elected with
“no people” by swinging all of Portland.59
David Wu’s election demonstrates that “Asian Americans
are united more by the label that others put on them than by language, religion or ethnic or national ties.”60 Unlike the Latino
political movement, language does not exist as a tool for coalition. Although Asian Americans experience discrimination, it
does not have as great an impact on their socio-economic status.

For example, the U.S. Census Bureau estimates that 50% of
Asian Americans over age twenty-five have at least a bachelor’s
degree in comparison to the overall average of 27%.61 Stereotypes of Asian Americans as the model minority are not as debilitating as the stereotypes for Latinos. Race politics are increasingly becoming a moot point due to the relatively minute
size of the Asian American population and its economic and
social diversity.62 As Asian American communities become
more diverse, they become increasingly divided on political issues. An especially significant rift has arisen between the
“liberal Asian American establishment” and the relatively new
Asian American neo-conservative movement.63 Additionally,
“[m]any new Asian immigrants […] are coming to the United
States with no sense of Asian American solidarity and little understanding of the Asian American history of oppression.”64

CONCLUSION
Asian Americans have learned that the key to political success is not in race politics or the promotion of a pan-ethnic political identity, but rather to divorce themselves from their
Asian-ness and focus on broader appeal. Even in areas dominated by Asian Americans such as South Pasadena, they have
never played race as a political card. As an Asian American city
councilor in South Pasadena said, “I never campaign as an
Asian. I campaign as a concerned citizen.”65 As the United
States becomes more diverse, lingering reasons for an Asian
American political coalition will become outdated. Asian
Americans will quietly continue their growth on the political
scene, generating issue-based, but not race-based appeal. The
continued diversification of the Asian American community
signals the death knell of any lingering Asian American political
unity. Unless Asian Americans can find a new common ground,
the answer will likely remain, “Does Connie Chung count?”
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LEAVE THOSE KIDS ALONE:
WHY THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOES NOT PROTECT THE BOY
SCOUTS OF AMERICA IN ITS DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
GAY YOUTH MEMBERS
By Sean Griffith, J.D.*

O

n June 9, 2003, the Boy Scouts of America’s (“BSA”)
Cradle of Liberty Council released a position statement
on its leadership standards stating, “[a]pplications for
leadership and membership do not inquire into sexual orientation. However, an individual who declares himself to be a homosexual would not be permitted to join Scouting. All members
in Scouting must affirm the values of the Scout Oath and Law,
and all leaders must be able to model those values for youth.”1
Additionally, the position statement reaffirms that “the Boy
Scout promises to do his duty to God and to be morally straight,
as well as to be clean in his thoughts, words and deeds.”2 These
position statements are a clear indicator that the BSA intends to
extend its ban on gay leaders to its youth members.3
The Supreme Court’s existing framework for deciding when
a state’s interest in preventing discrimination conflicts with a
private group’s right to associate leaves open a grey area with
regard to the denial of youths’ membership to the BSA. The
BSA’s ban on openly gay youth members likely goes beyond the
scope of the Supreme Court’s decision in Boy Scouts of America
v. Dale, which found that a state could not compel the BSA to
retain an avowed homosexual as an assistant scoutmaster.4
This article will argue that Boy Scouts of America v. Dale
should extend only to persons in adult leadership positions
within the BSA and that its current ban on openly gay youth
members constitutes unacceptable discrimination. This article
asserts that states have a compelling interest in preventing the
discrimination of youth members based on sexual orientation
that outweighs the BSA’s First Amendment right of expressive
association. Finally, a state may have a further compelling interest in protecting youth members of the Boy Scouts from discrimination because of the unique role the group plays in children’s education.

THE SUPREME COURT: WHEN GROUP FREEDOMS
CONFLICT WITH THE STATE’S INTEREST
The Supreme Court held that freedom of association is a
fundamental right that, while not explicitly stated in the Constitution, is protected by the First Amendment. In protecting this
right the Supreme Court recognizes two distinct incarnations of
the freedom to associate. First, individuals have a freedom of
intimate association which protects close relationships from government imposition by acting as a “critical buffer between the
individual and the power of the state.”5 Second, the Supreme
Court recognized that citizens must have freedom of expressive
association, which protects First Amendment rights against gov8

ernment intrusion by allowing individuals to unite with others
holding common views for an expressive purpose.6 This article
is concerned with the freedom of expressive association.
Implicit in the freedom to associate is the freedom not to
associate, which is to say, the freedom to discriminate.7 Conversely, the Supreme Court has recognized that a state may have
a compelling interest in protecting certain classes of people from
discrimination.8 States have passed public accommodation statutes which prohibit private groups from denying an individual
access to a public accommodation because of his or her race, sex,
orientation, or other characteristics. In Roberts, the Supreme
Court emphasized that public accommodations laws “plainly
serve[d] compelling state interests of the highest order,”9 and
recognized that a state's compelling interest in mandating equal
access to women extends to the acquisition of leadership skills
and business contacts.10 Therefore, because the Supreme Court
recognizes both a group’s freedom to discriminate and a state’s
interest in preventing discrimination, the stage is set for conflict.
In Roberts, Duarte, and New York Club Ass’n, the Supreme
Court laid the framework for considering how conflicts between
state interests and group rights should be decided.11 First, the
Supreme Court considered whether the state’s interest was compelling. All three cases recognized that states have a compelling
interest in eliminating public accommodations’ policies which
discriminated against women.12 Second, the Supreme Court
asked whether the group in question was an expressive association. In Roberts13 and Duarte,14 the Court found that individuals
had united to engage in purposeful, protected speech and thus,
the freedom to associate was implicated.15 Third, the Supreme
Court asked whether inclusion of the excluded group would burden the group’s messages. Although no burden was found in
these cases, the Supreme Court recognized that inclusion of an
unwanted group could impair the expressive capacity of the association enough to trigger First Amendment protection.16
In these three cases, the Supreme Court never had to balance
a state’s interest in preventing discrimination against a private
group’s First Amendment freedoms because in all three cases,
the Supreme Court found no burden on First Amendment activity.17 However, two points are vital to this article. First, Roberts
held that the amount of protection the First Amendment offers
may be conditional. “The nature and degree of constitutional
protection afforded freedom of association may vary depending
on the extent to which one or the other aspect of the constitutionally protected liberty is at stake.”18 Second, even where a court
recognizes that inclusion of an unwanted group will burden an
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association’s ability to express its message, “[t]he right to associate for expressive purposes is not, however absolute. Infringements on that right may be justified by regulations adopted to
serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of
ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less
restrictive of association freedoms.”19

DALE: WHEN THE STATE CANNOT FORCE A
GROUP TO ADMIT A LEADER WHO WOULD
COMPROMISE EXPRESSION
James Dale began scouting as an eight year old and attained
the rank of Eagle Scout at the age of eighteen. The following
year he applied for adult membership, and BSA approved him
for the position of assistant scoutmaster. During this time Dale
became the co-president of the Rutgers University Lesbian/Gay
Alliance and was interviewed by a newspaper regarding his advocacy for the psychological needs of homosexual teenagers.
Soon after, Dale received a letter from a BSA executive asking
him to revoke his adult membership.20 Dale was denied his right
to attend a hearing to review his case because BSA, “does not
admit avowed homosexuals to membership in the organization.”21
Consequently, Dale filed a complaint against the BSA, alleging that it violated New Jersey’s public accommodations statute, Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”), by revoking his admittance because of his sexual orientation.22 The BSA successfully appealed the case to the Supreme Court, which held that
applying New Jersey’s public accommodations law to the BSA
violated its First Amendment right of expressive association.23
The Supreme Court first considered whether BSA was an
expressive group, and if so, whether an anti-homosexual message was part of its expression, noting that the purpose of BSA
is to instill values in youths, “by having its adult leaders spend
time with the youth members, instructing and engaging them” in
various activities.24 “The scoutmasters and assistant scoutmasters inculcate them with the Boy Scouts’ values – both expressly
and by example.”25 Thus, the Supreme Court held that BSA is
an expressive group, with its expression being antihomosexuality.26 The Supreme Court held that the judiciary
may not “reject a group’s expressed values because they disagree with those values or find them internally inconsistent.”27
If BSA claims to be anti-homosexual, the Court holds, it “cannot
doubt that the Boy Scouts sincerely holds this view.”28
Next, the Supreme Court asked, “whether Dale’s presence
as an assistant scoutmaster would significantly burden the Boy
Scouts’ desire to not promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.”29 The Court declared, “as we give deference to an association’s assertions regarding the nature of its
expression, we must also give deference to an association’s view
of what would impair its expression.”30 The Court emphasized
that Dale was a gay activist and his presence as a leader would
“at the very least, force the organization to send a message, both
to the youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts
homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.”31
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The Supreme Court then analogized this case to Hurley v.
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston. In
Hurley, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that the Gay,
Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB) was entitled to
march because it was impossible to detect an expressive purpose
in the parade, there was no state action, and the parade was a
public accommodation.”32 The South Boston Allied War Veterans Council (“Council”) did not wish to exclude GLIB because
of the orientation of its members, but because it did not want to
march behind a GLIB banner. However, the Supreme Court
reversed the Massachusetts Court’s decision finding there was
no violation of Massachusetts’ public accommodation law by
the Council in excluding the GLIB from the parade. The Supreme court consistently ruled that GLIB’s presence behind a
banner would have “interfered with the parade organizers’
choice not to propound a particular point of view, the presence
of Dale as an assistant scoutmaster would just as surely interfere
with the Boy Scouts’ choice not to propound a point of view
contrary to its beliefs.”33 Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled
that requiring BSA to, “retain Dale as an assistant scoutmaster
would significantly burden the organization’s right to oppose or
disfavor homosexual conduct.”34
Finally, the Court considered whether the New Jersey public accommodations law requiring that the Boy Scouts accept
Dale as an assistant scoutmaster interferes with the Scouts’ freedom of expressive association.35 Without ruling directly on
whether BSA was a public accommodation or whether New
Jersey had a compelling interest, the Court distinguished Dale
from Duarte, Roberts, and New York State Club Assn. While
the Court found a compelling state interest in each of these
cases, there were no “significant burdens” to expressive association and as such, the Supreme Court did not have to balance
state interests against group rights in any of those cases.36 In
Dale, however, the Supreme Court had to conduct a balancing
test because of its finding of a “significant burden” and held that
the “state interests embodied in New Jersey’s public accommodations law do not justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy
Scouts’ rights to freedom of expressive association.”37

LEAVE THOSE KIDS ALONE
Given the BSA’s vocal opposition to gay members as well
as adult leaders in their position statement of 2003, it is likely
that they will attempt to bar openly gay youth in the same manner as the ejection of Dale from the BSA. In doing so, the BSA
will likely attempt to invoke Dale as extending to openly gay
youth.

WHY THE BSA CANNOT DIRECTLY EXTEND DALE TO
YOUTH MEMBERS
There are two main reasons why the Supreme Court should
read Dale as restricted to adult leadership positions, and not
youth members. First, the language of every Dale holding specifically pertains to adult leadership positions. Second, Dale’s
critical analogy to Hurley would prove unworkable if it was
9

meant to apply to youth membership. Additionally, lower courts
have reached no consensus on a reading of Dale.38
In Dale, the Supreme Court determined that BSA was an
expressive association and that an anti-homosexual message was
part of their First Amendment protected speech.39 However, in
the Supreme Court’s examples of how this message was expressed, it only cited the expressions of adult leadership. BSA
wrote that its mission was
“to instill values in young people… by having its
adult leaders spend time with the youth members…
During this time spent with the youth members, the
scoutmasters and assistant scoutmasters inculcate
them with the Boy Scout’s values – both expressly
and by example.”40
In every example the Supreme Court offered, the speaker was
the adult scout leader and the audience was the youth member.
The Supreme Court did not address the expressive message of
the individual boy scouts who were “inculcated.”
Having established that BSA is an expressive group with an
anti-homosexual message, the Supreme Court then considered
“whether Dale’s presence as an assistant scoutmaster would
significantly burden the Boy Scouts’ desire to not ‘promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.’”41 The
Supreme Court found in the affirmative, finding that allowing
Dale to continue as a leader would, “force the organization to
send a message, both to the youth members and the world, that
the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form
of behavior.”42 The Supreme Court did not rule on whether it
was Dale’s identity as a gay activist, a gay scout leader, or
merely self-identification as being gay which would burden the
BSA’s message. The Supreme Court only asked whether Dale,
who was a vocal gay advocate, would burden the Scouts message.
Based on the preceding findings, it seems likely the Supreme Court intended a narrow holding. The language of Dale
is confined to answering a question about James Dale and possibly adult leadership positions in general, but it never represents
youth members as speakers. As such, the holding should be
limited to vocal gay advocates in positions of adult leadership.
Rather, the youth members are the intended audience of BSA’s
speech and message and the Supreme Court does not identify
any expressive role for them.
Furthermore, the Dale Court relies greatly on Hurley.
While the Council stated their reasoning for not admitting the
GLIB into the parade was because they did not want to march
behind a banner,43 the Council would not have had power to
deny admittance to individual homosexuals who wished to
march.44 If the Dale decision were meant to extend to youth
members without any contention that youth members expressed
the BSA’s message, then the Court would be allowing BSA to
discriminate based only on sexual orientation, which was explicitly prohibited in Hurley.45 The analogy between Hurley and
Dale only works if Dale is read not to implicate youth members.
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WHY THE FIRST AMENDMENT BALANCING TEST
FAVORS GAY YOUTH MEMBERS OF THE BSA
It is important to note the significance of the absence of a
Supreme Court ruling on whether BSA should be considered a
public accommodation in Dale. One of the pre-requisites of a
violation of the First Amendment right to expressive association
is state action. As noted earlier, state public accommodation
laws circumvent the requirement of state action to apply to private groups.46 Because the Supreme Court in Dale declined to
rule directly on the issue of public accommodation, going directly to the First Amendment balancing test, it set the precedent
that a case regarding exclusion of the BSA’s gay youth members
should be governed by the balancing test.
Consequently, the Supreme Court would need to conduct a
balancing test and find that the state’s interests in preventing
discrimination against children would outweigh the group’s interest in expressive association. Two factors would weigh in
favor of the state’s interest in preventing discrimination: inclusion of a gay youth member would be less of a burden than inclusion of a gay scout leader;47 and, the state has a recognized
compelling interest in protecting youths from BSA’s discrimination because of the unique role it plays in children’s education.48
The Supreme Court was clear that James Dale was an expressive agent of the BSA and, like a group holding a banner in
Hurley, he contributed to the overall message of the organization. While gay adult scout leaders may be denied participation
in the BSA because they are expressive agents analogous to sign
holders in Hurley, a youth member is more analogous to the gay
individual who wishes to march in the parade without a sign.
Hurley is clear, moreover, that the First Amendment does not
protect an expressive association’s decision to deny the mere
presence of an individual based only on his or her orientation.49
Thus, a person’s presence alone is not expressive. Just as individual gay marchers could not have burdened the Council’s expression enough to outweigh the commonwealth’s interest in
preventing discrimination, a BSA youth member’s presence
alone cannot burden expression enough to outweigh a state’s
interest in preventing discrimination.
A state may also have a compelling interest in protecting
youths from BSA’s discrimination because of the unique role
the group plays in children’s education. This compelling interest may outweigh BSA’s freedom of expressive association. In
Boy Scouts of America v. Wyman, Judge Calabresi writing for a
unanimous court upholding the state interest in Connecticut’s
Gay Rights Law over the BSA’s right to associative expression,
personally noted that,
“[i]t is possible that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, a state that has adopted a policy of equal protection with respect to a specific group may have a
compelling interest in the enforcement of that policy, even if the federal government has not recognized that same group’s claim to heightened scrutiny
for the purposes of equal protection…”50
Merely because the state interest in Dale could not outweigh
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BSA’s right to expressive association does not mean that other
states with less restrictive expressive association rights do not
have a compelling enough state interest to justify the restrictions.51
Not only have courts recognized that states may have a
compelling interest in eliminating discrimination, but they have
also acknowledged states’ “compelling interest in educating its
youth, to prepare them to participate effectively and intelligently
in our open political system, and to be self-reliant and selfsufficient participants in society.”52 The Boy Scouts prepare
children to be all of these things during a time when, as the BSA
proclaims on its web site, nearly one in five children in the
United States lives in poverty.53
In programs like “Scoutreach,” the BSA “targets youth in
distressed areas of [the U.S.], where they have many chances to
fail, and few opportunities to succeed, much less to excel.” The
BSA tries to help the many children in the United States who
struggle with the issues of “[s]ingle parent families, often
headed by mothers and grandmothers, unemployment, a pattern
of alcohol and drug abuse and family income below the poverty
line.”54 Representative Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) explains that
the Boy Scouts is, “America's number one values program for
youth. Scouting helps strengthen character, develops good citizenship, and enhances both mental and physical fitness among

its participants. Scouting has helped countless youths from broken families by providing them with the moral discipline and
leadership they would have otherwise lacked.”55

CONCLUSION
When it comes to the state’s interest in preventing discrimination, children are easily distinguishable from grown men.
James Dale was a grown man. The educational needs, identity
formation, and self-esteem of an adult is not comparable to a
child, who is just developing a sense of self and habits for success. The balancing test the Supreme Court should engage in is
not simply between the interests of a private group and the state,
but between the irrefutable needs of children and a group’s interest in an untrammeled message. Each year, the Boy Scouts provide stability, discipline, and community to hundreds of thousands of youths, helping them become successful adults.
If a case based on the BSA’s exclusion of gay youth is
raised, the Supreme Court should address the interests of the
children. Furthermore, the Supreme Court should find not only
that Dale does not extend to the non-leadership positions in the
BSA, but also that a state has a compelling interest in the rearing
of its children that outweighs whatever burden a gay youth
member could place on the message of the nation-wide Boy
Scouts of America.
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CRITICIZING CRITICISM OF CRITICISM:
A LESSON IN OBJECTIVITY FROM REVIEWING
“IS THE RADICAL CRITIQUE OF MERIT ANTI-SEMETIC?”
By David Dae Hoon Kim, J.D.*

E

ight years ago, professors Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry compiled a collection of articles into a
book entitled, Beyond All Reason.1 Although they selfidentify as Jewish liberals, Farber and Sherry argue that certain
liberals, who they call “radical constructivists,”2 undermine the
“aspiration to universalism and objectivity that is the fruit of the
European Enlightenment.”3 By writing this book they sought to
reclaim reason in the law.
“Is the Radical Critique of Merit Anti-Semitic?,”4 adapted as
a chapter in Beyond All Reason, was originally a law review
article published in the California Law Review. The article challenges critical legal theories for adopting the radical critique of
merit, merit being measures of group success and achievement.
The article argues that if existing standards of merit are not valid,
history has taught that the available explanations for Asian
American and Jewish success must be anti-Asian and antiSemitic.
Farber and Sherry argue that because radical constructivists
could not possibly wish to endorse anti-Asianism and antiSemitism, radical constructivism is internally inconsistent and
thus, the wrong approach for critiquing merit. Farber and Sherry
propose an alternative approach to radical constructivism: pragmatism. Pragmatism accommodates societal and legal change,
but defers more to tradition and, according to the authors, does
not have anti-Asian and anti-Semitic consequences. However,
while Farber and Sherry aspire to objectivity, they fail to adhere
to objective principles in making their argument for pragmatism,
ultimately leading to the same result they fear under radical constructivism and unwittingly applying another strain of it.

RADICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AND PRAGMATISM
CONTRASTED
Farber and Sherry define the “meritocratic ideal” as the belief that “positions in society should be based on the abilities and
achievements of the individual rather than on characteristics such
as family background, race, religion, or wealth.”5 Furthermore,
“[i]n a society that uses merit as a standard for professional success, everyone should have an equal right to compete for desirable occupations.”6 But according to Farber and Sherry, the radical constructivist position on merit views “fundamental concepts
as socially constructed aspects of systems of power.”7 Specifically, “standards of merit are socially constructed to maintain the
power of dominant groups,”8 and thus, “‘merit’ has no meaning,
except as a way for those in power to perpetuate the existing
hierarchy.”9
Farber and Sherry find this reasoning politically convenient
12

because it allows radical constructivists to avoid investigating
the underlying reasons for inequality by focusing on effects.
That is, arguing that “the unequal success rates are per se proof
of unjust treatment . . . and sufficient justification for remedial
action.”10
To set up the consequences of radical constructivism, Farber
and Sherry first assert that “[b]y almost every measure of success, [Jews and native-born Asian Americans] succeed at far
higher rates than white gentile Americans.”11 Farber and Sherry
argue that radical constructivism undermines these successes,
leading to invariably negative stigmas for these groups. To support their argument, Farber and Sherry provide four historical,
prejudicial explanations for the successes of Jews and Asian
Americans in America as alternatives to those based on accepting existing standards of merit.
The first explanation purports Asians and Jews succeed as a
consequence of a “powerful and pervasive” Asian and Jewish
conspiracy (“conspiracy” theory).12 The second explanation
characterizes Asians and Jews as “chameleons who, with no culture of their own, take on the cultural coloration of the society
around them” (“cultural imitation” theory).13 A third account
charges Asians and Jews with infiltrating American culture
(“cultural infiltration” theory). According to this account, “Jews
succeed because American culture has taken on Jewish characteristics . . . [i]f American culture is really Jewish culture, then
Jews are the cause of these deficiencies in our culture and are
themselves deficient and unappealing.”14 The final explanation
finds Asian and Jewish success is nothing more than a statistical
anomaly (“statistical anomaly” theory). This is “in many ways
the most damaging, because it amounts to a denial that Jews exist as a distinct or identifiable group.”15
These explanations, because they are undesired consequences of radical constructivism, are deemed sufficient to establish a case against this mode of thought: “Having deconstructed
merit into pure power, radical constructivists face an implication
they will surely find wholly unpalatable – for if merit is merely
group power, then Jewish success becomes the fruit of Jewish
power. That way lies madness.”16
Finding radical constructivism undesirable, Farber and
Sherry assess three alternative theories. The ‘arbitrariness’ view
argues that, “[b]ecause certain groups were, for whatever reason,
non-participants during the creation of the standard, they tend to
be excluded by those standards.”17 However, this view’s lack of
normative basis does not allow any judgments against discriminatory policies.18 The ‘objectivist’ view holds, “completely objective, timeless standards of merit do exist, [but] there can be no
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guarantee that we have reached a final understanding of those
standards.19 Farber and Sherry prefer the pragmatist view,
which is aligned with the objectivist belief in standards, but
“values tradition as the essential foundation for intellectual and
social progress.”20
Farber and Sherry adopt a useful and optimistic definition
of objectivity, consistent with their moderate politics. Objectivity is “the aspiration to eliminate beliefs based on bias, personal
idiosyncrasy, fiat, or careless investigation.”21 Because it relies
upon aspiration, Farber and Sherry’s objective merit, premised
on the meritocratic ideal, allows for evolving standards of merit
not entrenched in the status quo and allows for groups to achieve
disproportionate success.
Objectivism and pragmatism seem initially consistent with
this objective merit allowing for criticism of existing concepts.
Objectivism acknowledges that “[a]n objective standard can be
distorted by the limited vision of those in power.”22 Pragmatism
“neither reifies tradition nor denies the importance of experimentation.”23 However, even armed with the best intentions in
pursuing objective merit, just as groups in power may exercise
limited vision within the objectivist framework, Farber and
Sherry fall victim to lapses in objectivity leading to unintended
consequences. In arguing against radical constructivism and for
Asian and Jewish merit, they demonstrate: (1) careless investigation, (2) fiat, and (3) bias or personal idiosyncrasy.

RADICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AND PRAGMATISM
COMPARED
CARELESS INVESTIGATION
The disproportionately higher incomes and disproportionate
representation of Asian and Jewish Americans in higher education brings Farber and Sherry to the conclusion that “[b]y almost
every measure of success, both groups succeed at far higher
rates than White Gentile Americans.”24 This conclusion is hasty
in three major respects, showing careless investigation on Farber
and Sherry’s part.
First, Farber and Sherry arbitrarily compare the single ethnicity of Jewish Americans, to a racial category, Asian Americans, which contains dozens of ethnicities.25 Farber and Sherry
use the identifiers “Chinese American,” “Japanese American,”
and “Korean American” interchangeably with the general category, “Asian Americans,” and do not mention Vietnamese,
Cambodian, Hmong, Indian, or Pakistani Americans, etc. Farber and Sherry consolidate the diverse Asian American community into a singular identity, falsely analogizing the alleged success of Chinese, Japanese, and sometimes Korean Americans as
representative of the entire Asian American community.
Focusing on the success of a single ethnically distinct minority to dispel claims of racial discrimination, especially where
the ethnic minority is a part of the racial majority in America, is
imprecise. In fact, Farber and Sherry argue against themselves
by citing statistics that demonstrate that economic success is
racially dependent, not racially neutral: Jewish Americans are
the most economically successful White ethnic group. Chinese
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and Japanese Americans are the most economically successful
Asian American ethnic groups. In 1970, Jewish Americans
earned 172% of the average American income, but their Asian
analogs, the Chinese and Japanese Americans, earned 40% and
60% less, respectively.26 This data tends to reinforce that
Whites and Asians are not on par in America.
Second, Farber and Sherry do not consider other fundamental factors that would allow proper analysis of the data. The
cited statistics on incomes do not control for the levels of education Chinese, Japanese, and Korean Americans achieve. In fact,
the data shows that although Asian Americans in the aggregate
have high educational levels, their incomes do not reflect their
education, especially compared with incomes of groups with
similar education levels.27 Asian immigrants, in particular, do
not attain achievement commensurate to their skills and education.
Third, Farber and Sherry make the far-ranging assertion that
economic status and representation in higher education accounts
for “almost every measure of success.” There are many other
vital measures of success by which Asian Americans do not
succeed at rates higher than Whites.28 For example, Asian
Americans endure stereotypes as the model minority, perpetual
foreigners, or passive/submissive peoples.29 Asian Americans
are often depicted in mainstream media in stereotypical and arbitrary ways.30 Asian Americans are regular targets of hate
crime.31 Despite economic success and educational attainment,
a glass ceiling bars Asian Americans from obtaining promotions
to higher levels of management.32 Asian Americans are also not
perceived as needing affirmative action even though they suffer
discrimination.33 At worst, Asian Americans are pitted against
other minorities resulting in catastrophic financial and psychological, i.e., Korean American small business owners in the Los
Angeles riots, or they are “scapegoated” resulting in a unique
deprivation of civil rights, i.e., Japanese American internment.
Thus, Farber and Sherry’s claim that Asian Americans succeed
at far higher rates than White Americans neglects to consider the
diversity of Asian Americans, the disproportionate effort they
expend, and other substantial indicia of success. These omissions show careless investigation.
FIAT
Farber and Sherry endorse an alternative mode of thought
called “pragmatism,” espoused by jurists like Richard Posner.
Pragmatists believe “current conceptions of objectivity, knowledge, and merit may be flawed, but are necessary starting points
in analysis,”34 and they “recognize the importance of logic and
clear thinking.”35 Under Farber and Sherry’s pragmatism, the
degree of deference to be given to current conceptions of merit
is vague and impractical. If current conceptions are necessary
starting points in analysis, this does not suggest that a presumption should weigh heavily in favor of keeping them. For example, a starting point can be analogized to a hypothesis in the scientific method. In the face of sufficient evidence to suggest
otherwise, a hypothesis, the starting point in analysis, can be
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readily rejected as a tentative explanation. Similarly, if current
conceptions of merit cease to explain differences in success rates
among ethnic groups, they should be discarded, not given continued deference.
Nevertheless Farber and Sherry argue that existing standards should be given the “benefit of the doubt.”36 This standard
suggests greater deference than starting points in analysis. The
article even inflates this standard, eventually stating that existing
standards should have a “rebuttable presumption of validity.”37
Current merit then: (1) is to be a necessary starting point; (2) is
to be given the benefit of the doubt; (3) and finally, is to receive
a rebuttable presumption of validity. It is not readily apparent
how this multifaceted characterization of pragmatism is expressly distinct from radical constructivism.
In fact, both radical constructivism and pragmatism emerge
as subjective viewpoints: radical constructivism exists on the
notion that merit is socially constructed by dominant groups to
maintain their hegemony; and pragmatism defers to tradition,
but recognizes that “current conceptions of objectivity, knowledge, and merit may be flawed.”38 The only difference between
the critiques is that Farber and Sherry subjectively judge standards in a context favoring tradition.
So even while Farber and Sherry classify pragmatism as an
“alternative”39 to radical constructivism, this brand of pragmatism may just represent another branch of radical constructivism
catering just another group, i.e., White European Americans.
Farber and Sherry fail to distinguish their definition of pragmatism from radical constructivism, thus evincing fiat and failing
the second element of objectivity.
BIAS
As a key premise of their argument, Farber and Sherry
claim radical constructivism allows only racist and anti-Semitic
explanations for Asian and Jewish success. “These groups have
obtained disproportionate shares of important social goods; if
they have not earned their shares fairly on the merits, then they
must have done so unjustly.”40 As summarized above, Farber
and Sherry propose four available theories for Asian and Jewish
success in America under the radical constructivism critique:
conspiracy, cultural imitation, cultural infiltration, and statistical
anomaly. These explanations are highly infused with connotations derived from the fear experienced by those in the position
of the majority.
By not adequately considering minority viewpoints, Farber
and Sherry ignore two universes of explanations that do not
have the same anti-Asian and anti-Semitic consequences. That
is, (1) explanations blaming the majority, and (2) explanations
recognizing Asian and Jewish resourcefulness in overcoming
culturally discriminatory barriers erected by the majority. The
former suggests neutral characterizations of Asian and Jewish
Americans. The latter suggests positive characterizations. Both
suggest that negative characterizations of the majority and current critiques of merit are not objective.
Many critical theorists would say that Asians and Jews
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succeed as a consequence of a powerful and pervasive majority
conspiracy to maintain the subordination of minority groups.41
For example, cultural imitation can be explained in Asian and
Jewish-neutral terms if one believes majority culture has subsumed and oppressed Asian and Jewish culture – the marginalization of these cultures results from majority intolerance of difference. Asian and Jewish Americans must assimilate because
they otherwise face alienation from mainstream participation.
Cultural infiltration in Asian and Jewish-neutral terms can
be explained by cultural overlap in their preferences and practices. The fact that mainstream Americans enjoy aspects of minority culture may be seen as their choice. The better question
is who determines what is incorporated into mainstream society,
not what gets incorporated.
Finally, statistical anomaly might be explained by a group
having the attributes most appropriate for success in a given
cultural moment. Success need not be a result of a particular
group being “better” than another, but simply out of being the
right group, at the right place, at the right time, in the right context.
Minorities may be able to attain above parity success in a
system biased against their interests by expending disproportionate effort and expense.42 History contains countless stories of
immigrant underdogs defeating the odds, but in the broad context of immigrant success, these stories are rare and do not validate the oppressive regime. With this considered, Asian and
Jewish American successes serve as an example of how two
groups achieved financial and educational successes despite the
structural barriers impeding their progress.
Asian and Jewish Americans’ relative success may be attributed to their cultural contributions to mainstream society and
their status as cultural “chameleons.” Cultural “chameleons” are
less threatening because of their adaptability. Both attributes
carry positive connotations and potentially remove dependency
on race and ethnicity to explain success. In light of these alternate explanations, current standards may still be in need of revision.
Giving disproportionate weight to limited perspective leads
Farber and Sherry to seemingly logical double standards. The
potential consequences of radical constructivism upon two specific groups is deemed dispositive for rejecting it altogether.
Farber and Sherry also forgo due inquiry into the existing effect
of current standards on other groups: they prefer a conception of
merit that has specific desired outcomes: no anti-Asianism, no
anti-Semitism, notwithstanding whether the current conception
of merit is presently anti-Latino or anti-Black. Taking on the
majority perspective allows Farber and Sherry to pursue the
same line of effects-based reasoning they criticize critical theorists for using.43

LESSONS OF AN ASPIRATIONAL OBJECTIVITY
Farber and Sherry’s objectivity contingent upon aspiration
is commendable, but in arguing against radical constructivism,
they fail to achieve it. Advocating for current standards without
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due examination of relevant perspectives, precise definitions,
and thorough investigation hinders the pursuit of objectivity.
Farber and Sherry evince bias by ignoring alternative explanations for Asian and Jewish success that are possible under radical constructivism. They evince fiat by proposing a pragmatist
model that has multiple interchangeable standards of deference
to be afforded to tradition. They evince careless investigation
by ignoring considerations that would provide a fuller and more
accurate assessment of Asian and Jewish success. Through bias,
fiat, and careless investigation, Farber and Sherry are led astray
from their ideal of objectivity.
But this is not to say Farber and Sherry should not have
spoken. Farber and Sherry express a sincere conviction about
the deficiencies of radical constructivism.44 If we keep quiet for
fear of being wrong or too subjective, it is possible we may
never speak and the fruits of public debate may never be enjoyed. Refusing to engage in debate leads to the “twin perils of
an unthinking adherence to tradition and an unreflective over
eagerness for change”45 that Farber and Sherry fear. However,
when we go about assessing their argument, we should remain

adherents to the principles required by objectivity. Where tradition is excessively optimistic, criticism is left out in the cold,
with no entry into the house of knowledge. Where criticism is
excessively pessimistic, tradition is a collection of foolish tales,
with no attachment to the tree of history.

CONCLUSION
Farber and Sherry’s article, “Is the Radical Critique of
Merit Anti-Semitic?” draws an arbitrary line between criticism
and objectivity by addressing the distinction between radical
constructivism and pragmatism within the context of merit. A
society adopting strategies of exclusive arbitrary line-drawing
generates barriers to debate that will not provide the freedoms
and equal opportunity it might hope to achieve. A better model
for objective merit balances criticism and tradition.
If even the best intentions lead to undesired outcomes, a
case for opening the debate is made. Bridging the perceived gap
between radical constructivism and pragmatism, as opposed to
creating it, encourages dialogue to occur and critics to more
readily realize an aspirational objectivity.
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ABORTION, EUGENICS, AND A THREAT TO DIVERSITY
By Chris McChesney*

A

fter nearly three months of pregnancy, Mary sits in her in which parents have the option to abort a fetus solely for the
doctor’s office anxiously awaiting to hear the results. reason that the child would more likely than not be homosexual.
Though still in her first trimester, Mary’s doctor ex- Finally, this article will argue that while it may be a form of
plained to her that it is becoming more common, and even more eugenics and threat to diversity to abort a fetus based on Down
accurate, to have certain screening tests done early.1 Today syndrome or the hypothetical detection of homosexuality, the
Mary will learn if the child growing inside of her will be born woman’s right to choose must not be infringed upon, whatever
with Down syndrome, an abnormality in the 21st chromosome the reason for her choice.
that usually leads to mental retardation.2 If the test results show
AMERICA’S EUGENICS PAST
that her child will have Down syndrome, Mary will be forced to
make a host of difficult decisions, the hardest being whether or
The eugenics movement was most prominent in the United
not to carry the fetus to term. The majority of parents-to-be in States from the early twentieth century through World War II.7
Mary’s position, whose fetus tests positive for Down syndrome, Eugenics, first developed by Francis Galton, stemmed from early
choose to have an abortion rather than bringing the fetus to term knowledge of genetics and a desire among intellectuals to imand raising the child or allowing the child to be adopted.3 Many prove society.8 Society’s ills were blamed on groups of people
doctors counsel their patients in such circumstances to undergo who had traits that scientists believed to be inherited, including:
abortions and doctors who treat patients with Down syndrome disabilities, drug or alcohol addiction, homelessness, and
report seeing fewer and fewer patients.4 While not government “feeble-mindedness.”9 Backed by scientists, intellectuals, and
mandated, such abortions are government sanctioned even when politicians of the time, many states, beginning with Indiana in
the pregnancy is at a later stage and when other selective abor- 1907, passed laws based on the principles of eugenics.10 By the
tions are not permitted.5
1920s, twenty-seven states had codified
The reduction of people born with
such laws, most of which called for the
a disorder that can cripple families both
mandatory sterilization of certain
Eugenics is believed to be nonemotionally and financially may be
groups of people.11
existent in the United States
seen as an accomplishment of modern
While early court cases began to
science and medicine. Alternatively,
limit sterilization laws, the Supreme
today, but the systemic selective
given our country’s history, the drop in
Court upheld them in a 1927 case, Buck
breeding of humans remains a
the number of Down syndrome babies
v. Bell.12 The issue in Buck stemmed
current
part
of
society.
can be viewed as the eradication of a
from a Virginia court’s decision orderdistinct class of people. Eugenics is
ing the sterilization of eighteen-year
believed to be non-existent in the
old Carrie Buck based on her status as
United States today, but the systematic selective breeding of hu- an institutionalized person in the Virginia State Colony for Epimans remains a current part of society.6 The selective abortion leptics and Feeble Minded.13 Virginia institutionalized Buck
of fetuses with Down syndrome is not referred to as eugenics, because she was a “deviant” who had given birth to an illegitibut the parallel is easy to make. The future consequences of en- mate child, despite evidence that her pregnancy was the result of
hanced understanding of our genetic makeup and advances in a rape.14 Justice Holmes, writing for the eight-justice majority,
prenatal screening foreshadow a society that justifies eugenics as described Buck as, “the daughter of a feeble minded mother in
a means to creating the perfect child.
the same institution, and the mother of an illegitimate feeble
This article first discusses the history of eugenics in the U.S. minded child,” and determined in an infamous quote that,
and compares it with today’s treatment of prenatal detection of “[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough.”15 Ruling in favor
Down syndrome. Drawing on this comparison, the article will of the state, Holmes compared the sterilization to previously updiscuss potential advances in genetic screening and how such held mandatory vaccination policies, thus upholding sterilization
advances may be used for eugenic purposes. Specifically, the laws and solidifying eugenics as valid public policy.16 Ultiarticle will focus on the potential threat genetic advances and mately, over 60,000 people in the United States were lawfully
selective abortion pose to diversity, in particular, homosexuality, sterilized.17
via a eugenics-like desire for the perfect child. This article will
Only after the horrors of Nazi Germany and the Nuremburg
also discuss the genetic component of eugenics and the biologi- trials, did the United States begin to view eugenics in a negative
cal roots of homosexuality, arguing that homosexuality is not a light.18 However, although sterilization laws were not heavily
choice, but a predetermined trait. After discussing several scien- enforced, states were slow to repeal them; between 1970 and
tific studies and drawing the conclusion from them that there is a 1974, North Carolina sterilized twenty-three persons.19 The fedgenetic link to homosexuality, the article will pose a hypothetical eral government only banned the use of federal funds for sterili16
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zation in 1978 and as of 2004, seven states still had sterilization
laws on the books.20 Additionally, Buck has never been overturned, though a law requiring the sterilization of criminals was
overturned in 1942 (largely because criminality was not proven
inherited trait).21 The Court has also cited to Buck multiple
times, referring to it as valid case law, most notably in Roe v.
Wade to support the proposition that the state can impose some
limits on the right to privacy.22 The Court’s use of Buck as an
example on allowable limits on the right to privacy is far from
the historical support of eugenics. Indeed, the Court noted its
unfavorable opinion of eugenics when it reviewed Roe in
Planned Parenthood of Southern Pennsylvania v. Casey.23

would not limit a woman’s right to choose; rather, it would increase available information to women after prenatal tests detect
Down syndrome and prior to their decision of whether or not to
carry the fetus to term.36 Principally, the bill would expand
available information about Down syndrome, create access to
support services, and establish a national registry for those wishing to adopt children with Down syndrome.37 At the close of the
2005 legislative session, the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions was considering the bill.

GENETICS OF HOMOSEXUALITY

While Down syndrome has a clear genetic link detectable
through prenatal screening, allowing for the current eugenicsDOWN SYNDROME
like treatment of fetuses with Down syndrome, homosexuality is
Down syndrome is characterized by multiple physical traits not currently detectable in the womb. The two are not facially
including flat facial features, dysplastic ears, and an enlarged comparable; Down syndrome is considered a genetic disorder,
tongue in comparison to the mouth.24 It is also associated with while homosexuality is no longer deemed a disease or disormild to severe mental retardation.25 The cause of Down syn- der.38 For purposes of this article, however, the two will be
drome is the nondisjunction of chromosome 21, resulting in compared as minority groups, whose members do not choose
cells carrying three of the twenty-first chromosome instead of their status as a minority. Additionally, the classification of
the normal pair.26 This faulty cell division occurs in either the selective abortions as eugenics in cases of fetuses with Down
sperm or the egg prior to conception.27 Prenatal testing can ac- syndrome will be used in a hypothetical by replacing the deteccurately diagnose Down syndrome in fetuses through several tion of Down syndrome with the theoretical detection of homoprocedures: chorionic villus sampling (CVS), amniocentesis, sexuality in the womb. Prior to the hypothetical, this article will
and percutaneous umbilical blood sampling (PUBS).28 While discuss what is currently known about the genetics of homothese tests are typically done during the second trimester, new sexuality to give support to the premise that prenatal screening
studies are beginning to show that testing during the first trimes- will eventually have the capability to detect homosexuality in
fetuses.
ter is more effective.29
Though some argue that homoAn estimated 80% - 90% of Down
sexuality is a choice of lifestyle,39 scisyndrome fetuses are aborted, indicatAn estimated 80% - 90% of
ing it is a common practice among
ence is providing more and more conDown syndrome fetuses are
women who have learned that the feclusive evidence that sexuality is a
aborted...
tus they are carrying has Down synpredetermined trait that cannot be
drome.30 This practice is generally
changed.40 These studies continually
accepted among academics and the general public, with some bolster the contention that homosexuality is not a choice.41
going as far as saying that, “prospective parents have a moral Unlike many predetermined traits that can be linked to one gene
obligation to undergo prenatal testing and to terminate their or chromosome, sexuality is believed to be determined by both
pregnancy to avoid bringing forth a child with a disability.”31 genetics and conditions in the womb.42 In the early 1990s, a
Analogizing such a position with the eugenics philosophy of our “gay” gene was discovered, but the results were not repeated
past is not difficult. After all, people with mental disabilities and the study sample was small.43 The study’s result indicated
were one of the groups forcefully sterilized; preventing their the locus Xq28 (a point on the X chromosome) had a higher
very existence is the ultimate form of breeding them out of soci- probability of being the same among homosexual brothers, sugety.32
gesting the gene has a link to the trait of homosexuality.44 Since
Recently, the comparison to eugenics has begun to be pub- then, a host of genetic discoveries have been made along with
licly discussed, generally by those associated with the Pro-Life studies showing anatomical and physiological similarities
movement.33 Proponents of selectively aborting fetuses with among gay men and studies of homosexuality in other animals,
Down syndrome avoid the eugenics comparison and point to the including sheep, penguins, and fruit flies.45
emotional and financial burdens a child with Down syndrome
In 2005, two separate groups of scientists published articles
imposes on a family, concluding that neither a woman, nor soci- detailing their studies, which located a gene in fruit flies that has
ety, should be forced to carry such a burden.34 The debate the ability to change sexual orientation.46 The gene, which gereached the Senate with the introduction of the ‘Prenatally Diag- neticists refer to as the fruitless (fru) gene, controls male courtnosed Condition Awareness Act’ by Senator Brownback (R-KS) ship behavior and orientation, but not sexual anatomy.47 There
and co-sponsored by Senator Kennedy (D-MA).35 The bill are both male specific fru (fruM) and female specific fru (fruF)
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genes. When geneticists spliced the female version into male
flies, the male ceased courtship of females, and when paired
with other male flies spliced with the female version, showed
male-male courtship behavior.48 Similar results occurred in females; when the male version was spliced into female flies, they
began to actively court other females not spliced with the male
gene.49 While the study does not prove such a gene exists in
humans, it does show there is a genetic link to sexual behaviors
in fruit flies, which share a majority of genes with humans.50
Along with genetics, several anatomical and physiological
characteristics have been studied and compared between homosexuals and heterosexuals.51 Sweat glands produce pheromones
as a response to sexual behavior.52 By monitoring brain activity
of sexually dimorphic nuclei, Swedish scientists determined that
homosexual men were aroused in a similar manner as women by
pheromones produced by men.53
Several anthropometric
(measurement and characteristics of the body) studies have also
been conducted, with the most conclusive study relating to finger length.54 The majority of men have ring fingers that are
longer than the index finger and women tend have approximately equal length ring and index fingers.55 Lesbians, however, tend to have a ring-index finger ratio similar to men, and
while not all gay men share the female ratio, men with the female finger ratio tend to be more sensitive and nurturing.56 Another common trait among homosexual men and women often
appears in the brain. In heterosexual men, the two brain hemispheres are more specialized whereas women have brain hemispheres that are more similar and share functions. Homosexual
men’s brains show the same relationship among the hemispheres
as women’s brain.57
Recently scientists have begun studying the brains of homosexual male sheep (rams).58 Among domesticated rams, approximately 6% - 8% only court and mate with other rams.59
Wild rams also have shown homosexual courtship behavior, as
do over 450 other animal species, including penguins, ostriches,
and chimpanzees.60 Scientists in Oregon have begun investigating why some rams are homosexual and have discovered differences in the brains of heterosexual rams and homosexual rams.61
The sexually dimorphic nucleus is typically larger in males than
it is in females, but gay rams have a sexually dimorphic nuclei
that resembles the smaller nuclei found in ewes as opposed to
other rams.62 A 1991 study showed similar results among the
sexually dimorphic nucleus of humans.63
While these studies do not show a direct link between genetics and homosexuality, they do support that homosexuality is
not a choice.64 Genes merely code proteins, and there are several steps between genes and behavior.65 Most scientists, however, will acknowledge that homosexuality is genetic, although
environmental factors, such as testosterone levels in the womb,
likely play a role.66 Given this, it is not hard to hypothesize that
scientists will find a direct link to homosexuality. However, as
geneticist Dean Hamer, a leading researcher noted, many heterosexual scientists do not research the so-called “gay gene” be-
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cause they do not want to offend anyone.67 After all, “if scientists identify a ‘gay gene,’ will expectant parents use it for selective abortion?”68

HOMOSEXUAL HYPOTHETICAL:
DIVERSITY VERSUS CHOICE
The potential detection of homosexuality is far different
from the prenatal detection of Down syndrome.69 As scientists
learn more about the roots of homosexuality and its genetic
links, it may become possible to determine that a child will
likely be born gay. This determination, like all prenatal testing,
may not be 100% accurate, but a doctor may be able to tell parents that their child has a certain percent chance of being gay.70
If this percentage provides a more likely than not chance that the
child will be gay, parents will face a difficult question -- should
they have a child knowing that he or she will be born gay?
Often, some of the biggest fears expressed by parents when
their child comes out as being gay are based on their child’s
safety and future happiness.71 Being gay in a heteronormative72
society can mean facing discrimination, misunderstanding, and
even danger.73 Hate crimes against gays remain a problem and
acceptance, or even tolerance, is never assured.74 In light of
these concerns, would a parent-to-be knowingly bring a child
into the world who could be hated solely for something they
cannot control?75 Would a parent-to-be whose religious convictions tell them homosexuality is sin and unacceptable bring a
child into the world if they believed they could never accept for
who the child truly would be? Would parents view their child’s
homosexuality as an imperfection like many view Down Syndrome?
A child should be loved for who they are when they are
born, whether gay or straight, disabled or not. However, as has
been the case with Down syndrome, parents often want the perfect child and some choose to abort what is perceived to be an
imperfect fetus. A controversy erupted in Britain when a parent
was allowed to abort a child past the point of viability because it
was determined that the child would have a cleft palate.76 Given
this controversy, along with current homophobic attitudes, it is
not outlandish to imagine a parent aborting a fetus because the
child will be born gay. If that were to become the norm, abortion could begin to pose an even bigger threat to diversity than it
presently does.
Considering this country’s history, it is not unreasonable to
believe U.S. citizens would attempt to selectively remove a
group of people from the population by practicing eugenics; in
fact, it is not outrageous to assert that eugenics is alive and well
as demonstrated by the abortion of the vast majority of fetuses
with Down syndrome.77 As genetics and prenatal testing become more advanced, abortion may become a legitimate means
to lowering diversity and reigniting eugenics as parents strive to
have “perfect” heterosexual children. This would truly be a
travesty, not only to the minority communities affected, but to
the nation as whole. Diversity plays a vital role in this country
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and should be protected, but should it be protected to the detriment of woman’s right to choose?

CONCLUSION
The choice of whether or not to have a child is a personal
one. Thus, a woman’s right to choose should not be infringed
upon, no matter her reasoning. Despite the importance of diversity and the importance of protecting the rights of minorities,
including homosexuals and those with disabilities, placing restrictions on the allowed reasons for having an abortion previability would arguably violate the standard of an “undue burden” set out in Casey, which was recently reaffirmed in Ayotte v.
Planned Parenthood of Northern New England.78 A state may
offer alternatives, educate those wishing to obtain an abortion,
and develop other such regulations with regard to the right to
choose; a state regulation, however, may not impose an undue
burden on a woman’s right to choose.79 Telling a woman what
reasons are valid to have an abortion and that she is not allowed
to have an abortion if she has different reasons would certainly
be an undue burden to place on a woman’s right to choose.
Abortion and advancements in genetics have the potential to
become, and within some communities have already become,
another form of eugenics. Even so, regulating the reasons for a
woman’s choice is not the solution, nor is halting advancements
in genetic technology; rather, the solution lies in education. The

current tragedy of aborting fetuses with Down syndrome can
and should be curbed with legislation similar to the bill introduced by Senator Brownback and Senator Kennedy. Knowing
that people with Down syndrome lead happy, healthy lives, and
that there are parents who want to adopt unwanted Down syndrome babies may change some decisions to abort, without placing an undue burden on their right to do so. Similarly, as scientists learn more about the roots of homosexuality, people may
begin to accept that sexuality is not a choice. As acceptance and
rights increase for the LGBT community, parents will not fear as
much for the safety of their gay children, and they themselves
may become more accepting of having a gay child.
Diversity and protecting individual rights are a vital part of
this country. However, in this case, the legal system can only
protect diversity so much before it may interfere with individual
rights, such as placing an undue burden on a woman’s right to
choose. When this happens, it becomes the task of the individual to advocate and protect diversity. Twenty years from now,
Mary’s daughter may have to decide whether to abort her own
fetus, which she has just learned will be gay. If she decides to
abort her child and further the practice of eugenics, it will be
because our country failed to educate, promote, and accept all
forms of diversity — including homosexuality — not the failure
to restrict a woman’s right to choose.
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SPOTLIGHT ON MICHAEL NAVA:
WRITING THE WRONGS FOR ALL
By María Lucero Ortiz*

M

ost
st ud en t s rather than academic, reasons. "I felt like such an outsider,” he
studying for the remembers, “I was no longer part of the working-class brown
California
bar community where I grew up, but I would never be a part of the
could not imagine writing a upper middle-class white society of my classmates, many of
novel, but Michael Nava was whom had been groomed for law school from a young age. I
unlike most law students. think many of us from working-class minority backgrounds sufLate one night, after graduat- fer this kind of culture shock when we enter professional schools
ing from Stanford University and the emotional energy required to adjust to the culture of that
Law School, he began to environment can take a toll academically.”
He continued to write during law school, winning awards
write The Little Death, the
first of his seven-volume, for his poetry. Eventually, he turned to fiction and specifically,
critically acclaimed, legal to the mystery genre, to express his own history while giving life
Courtesy Stathis Orphanos
mystery series. His fictional to Henry Rios. During Nava’s youth, society considered homoprotagonist, Henry Rios, is an openly gay, Latino criminal de- sexuals as sick, sinners, or criminals. The only gay person he
fense attorney. In a recent interview with The Modern American, encountered as a child was a drag queen uncle. Nava could not
Nava explained his motives for creating Henry by citing a com- identify with these stereotypes. Enter Henry Rios, a dynamic
ment from Toni Morrison: “She once said that she wrote the kind character who, as a recovering alcoholic, deals with loving and
of books she wished she could have had to read when she was losing his lover to AIDS, being an openly gay Latino in Califorgrowing up as an African American. I wish that I had read nia, and finding a balance between what is morally right and
books with characters like Henry Rios when I was growing up as what is legally just.
Nava described the process of writing his first book as a
a gay Latino.”
Professionally, Nava has dedicated the majority of his ca- "lark," for which he had modest expectations. The Little Death
reer to the government sector, working as one of the few Latino was rejected by thirteen publishers before Alyson Books, an inappellate lawyers. Personally, Nava has created support systems dependent gay publisher, brought it out in 1986 and encouraged
for minority communities. This spotlight focuses on Nava's con- him to write a follow-up. His hard work paid off when his sectributions to social justice as an author and an attorney, in and ond book, Goldenboy, was critically acclaimed by the New York
out of the limelight, and the lessons to be learned from his Times, which described him as a brilliant storyteller. Over the
achievements.
next thirteen years, Nava wrote five more novels, received six
Nava grew up in a predominately working-class Mexican Lambda Literary awards, and was awarded the Whitehead
neighborhood in Sacramento, CaliforAward for Lifetime Achievement by a
nia, where his maternal family settled
gay or lesbian writer. He also received
For me, being an educated
in 1920 after escaping the Mexican
a grant in creative writing from the
Latino from a working-class
Revolution. His grandmother was an
California Arts Council and an honorinfluential force whose piety and hufamily was more alienating than ary degree as a Doctor of Humane Letmility were highlighted by her Catholic
ters from his alma mater, Colorado
being gay...
beliefs. As a precocious child, Nava
College. His books have been transconstantly read. He was the first perlated into to French, German, Japanese,
son in his family to attend college, where he excelled and ac- and Spanish. In addition, he also co-authored Created Equal:
quired a special affinity for literature and writing. He fondly Why Gay Rights Matter to America.
remembers debating the merits of one poet over another with his
The last of the Henry Rios novels, Rag & Bone, was pubfriends until the early hours of the morning.
lished in 2001 with widespread acclaim. For many of his readAfter graduating from Colorado College cum laude, he was ers, Nava’s decision to end the series was a personal loss because
awarded a Thomas Watson Fellowship to study abroad. He they had come to regard Henry Rios as a friend. Despite the
spent the next year in Buenos Aires and Madrid working on series ending, Nava continues to write, working on a novel based
translations of the great Spanish American poet Ruben Dario loosely on the early life of Mexican silent film star Ramon No(1867-1916). Returning home, he decided to go to law school varro (1899-1969).
after briefly contemplating a graduate degree in English or HisAt the beginning of his literary career, Nava was viewed
tory. Law school was a difficult experience for psychological largely as a gay writer, but he is now recognized as an important
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Latino writer, too. Each novel explores Henry’s psychological
struggles and the complex lives of “ordinary” people. Nava
portrays very honest and explicit accounts of gay love and sex
and the intimate tensions of an upwardly-mobile, educated Latino. “Henry isn’t me, but I borrowed from my psychological
experience to describe his character, especially the challenges he
faces as an educated Latino from a working-class family. In my
personal experience, being educated was more alienating than
being gay in terms of dealing with my family. I think many
Latinos and Latinas who entered the professions also face this
challenge.”
Outside the limelight of his literary celebrity, Nava dedicated his legal career to pursing social justice through the government sector. Nava insisted that, “attorneys of color need to
be everywhere. From corporate counsel to the bench and the
human rights organizations, we have to be in a position to institutionalize the diversification of the legal profession that has
begun with my generation of lawyers. This is the special challenge for law students of color – to build on what we began in
the 70s and 80s.” He also stated that attorneys of color have a
responsibility to work directly or through philanthropic activities
to expand access to justice for marginalized communities. In his
free time, Nava is an active member of the Most Holy Redeemer, a largely gay and lesbian Catholic parish in San Francisco with a deep tradition of social justice activism. He heads a
project in the parish to fund education for children in Africa
orphaned by AIDS. He is also a role model and a benefactor for
a charter school that sets high educational standards for firstgeneration, college bound Latino students. He contributes a
percentage of his annual income to charitable and cultural institutions. “We have to learn to become philanthropists,” he says,
“however modest our contributions may be.”
While practicing appellate law at a firm, a former Stanford
classmate encouraged Nava to apply for a judicial position with
Justice Arleigh Woods, the first African American woman appointed to the California Court of Appeals. After ten years with
Justice Woods, he was invited to apply for his current position
by a former colleague in the city attorney’s office. "Judicial
attorneys and law clerks can have a huge influence in shaping
the direction of the law, but there are very few attorneys of color
in those positions because they are mostly filled through the Old
Boys Network. We need to establish our own network.” This
kind of diversification among judicial attorneys and law clerks

will result in more inclusive and fair results in the cases that
come before the appellate judiciary. He advises law students
and practicing attorneys to perfect their legal writing skills and
to seek judicial clerkships to break into the profession as a judicial attorney.
In his current position as a judicial attorney, Nava works
for Justice Carlos R. Moreno in the California Supreme Court.
Justice Carlos R. Moreno is only the third Latino to sit on the
California high court. Nava deals with complex legal issues in
every area of civil and criminal law on one of the country’s most
active and well-respected courts. He is aware that his personal
beliefs and his professional responsibilities do not always mesh.
For example, while he is personally opposed to the death penalty, he has worked on death penalty cases in which the court
has affirmed the death sentence. “Once an attorney takes the
oath to uphold the law, he agrees to set aside some of his personal beliefs regarding the wisdom of those laws,” Nava explains, “Of course, you can become an advocate to change the
laws but I view my work within the appellate court system to be
important enough that I trade off my personal feelings about
some of the cases I work on in order to have some influence in
other crucial cases.”
As an author, Nava utilizes the written word to create a
vision that did not exist when he was a youth; as a lawyer, he
wields the written word to advocate for justice; and as a concerned citizen, he empowers others to pass on the knowledge
they have acquired through their legal and life experience. Nava
is an inspiration for all law students to write the wrongs.
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“HUMAN GARBAGE” OR TRASH-WORTHY LAW?
FLORIDA’S BAN ON GAY ADOPTION
IN THE INTERNATIONAL LIGHT
By Cecilia Isaacs-Blundin*

F

lorida law currently provides, “No person eligible to
adopt… may adopt if that person is a homosexual.”1
Legislation to change this provision died recently in the
Florida senate.2 Although several other U.S. states’ common law
discourage adoption by homosexuals,3 no other state has a statute
categorically excluding homosexuals, as a class, from adopting.
Florida’s uncompromising current statutory ban on adoption by
homosexuals is not only unique domestically;4 it also bucks the
larger Western world’s trend towards expansion of adoption
rights for gays and lesbians.5
This article will detail the Floridian approach to homosexual
adoption, looking at the various justifications for the existence of
Florida’s ban on gay adoption, while also identifying approaches
taken by selected foreign jurisdictions. It will then put forth domestic and international critiques of the Floridian justifications
for preventing gay and lesbian adoption, and will promote a different interpretation of the best interest of the child standard to
allow for gay adoption. Finally, this article concludes with the
assertion that, in light of international precedent, the Florida senate should have eliminated the categorical ban on adoption by
homosexuals.

FLORIDA’S LAW ON ADOPTION BY HOMOSEXUALS
Florida’s adoption law allows “any person, a minor or an
adult, [to] be adopted” by “a husband and wife jointly… an unmarried adult; or… a married person without the other
spouse…”6 Since 1977, however, the statute has also contained
a provision reading, “no person eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual.”7 At least five
congressional bills attempting to repeal the provision have been
introduced since its enactment,8 two of which were introduced in
the 2005 Florida senate session, but both died in committee.9
The first 2005 bill, introduced by Senator Rich, would have
maintained a general ban on gay adoption. However, it would
have allowed an exception in cases where, by clear and convincing evidence, the court finds “that the adoptee resides with the
person proposing to adopt the adoptee, the adoptee recognizes
the person as the adoptee’s parent, and granting the adoptee permanency in that home is more important to the adoptee’s developmental and psychological needs than maintaining the adoptee
in a temporary placement.”10 The second bill, proposed by Senator Dawson, aimed to replace Florida’s current provision that “no
homosexual may adopt under this statute if that person is a homosexual,” with a case-by-case evaluation of the best interest of
the child.11 The new section would state: “A prospective adoptive parent of a minor must undergo an individual assessment of
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his or her capacity to understand and meet the needs of the particular child.” Because none of the proposed bills passed, Florida statutory law continues to categorically prohibit adoption by
homosexuals.
The constitutionality of Florida’s provision banning adoption by homosexuals was challenged in state and federal court.
Over ten years ago, in Dept. of Health & Rehab. v. Cox, a Florida appeals court heard one such challenge.12 It upheld the provision as constitutional against challenges of vagueness, privacy,
and equal protection brought by two gay men seeking to adopt a
special needs child.13 Although the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the rulings, it remanded the case for further development
of the factual record.14 The case, however, was never heard on
remand because the plaintiffs withdrew the claim.15 Even so,
Cox established a working definition of “homosexual,” which
courts consider when evaluating the Florida statute.16 Cox defined that a “homosexual [is] limited to applicants who are
known to engage in current, voluntary homosexual activity,”
thereby making “a distinction between homosexual orientation
and homosexual activity.”17
More recently, the constitutionality of Florida’s statutory
ban on adoption by homosexuals has been upheld by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Lofton v. Dep’t of Children and
Family Servs.18 The Lofton case has been widely publicized19
and involved several plaintiffs, each of whose application for
adoption was denied under the Florida statute based on his homosexuality.20 At the district court level, in Lofton v. Kearney,
the defendants Secretary and District Administrator of Florida’s
Department of Children and Families asserted that the Florida
statute served two legitimate purposes.21 First, it “reflects the
State’s moral disapproval of homosexuality consistent with the
legislature’s right to legislate public morality.”22 Second, the
Department of Children and Families claimed that the best interests of the child are served when he or she is “raised in a home
stabilized by marriage, in a family consisting of both a father and
a mother” because “married heterosexual family units [will] provide adopted children with proper gender role modeling” and
will minimize social stigmatization.23 Like most other states,
Florida uses the “best interest of the child” standard to make
adoption determinations.24 In Lofton, summary judgment was
granted based on the Department’s arguments.25 The court accepted that even if the rationales underlying the assumptions are
flawed, “the very fact that they are ‘arguable’ is sufficient, on a
rational basis review, to ‘immunize’ the congressional choice
from constitutional challenge.”26 Pointing to the federal and
Floridian Defense of Marriage Act, the court added that:
23

[H]omosexuals are not similar in all relevant
aspects to other nonmarried adults with respect
to [the]… best interest of the child. Nonmarried
adults, unlike homosexuals, can get married. On
the other hand, homosexuals cannot marry or be
recognized as a marital unit and, thus, cannot
meet the state’s asserted interest underlying the
homosexual adoption provision.27
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
upheld the lower court decision.28 The opinion expounded several of the rational bases upon which the statute could indeed be
based.29 The court noted that Florida has a legitimate state interest in furthering public morality30 and that the statute is part of a
“broader adoption policy, designed to create adoptive homes
that resemble the nuclear family as closely as possible.”31 Citing “the accumulated wisdom of several millennia of human
experience” to confirmed “marital family structure” as a
“superior model,” the court reasoned that “it is rational for Florida to conclude that it is in the best interest of adoptive children .
. . to be placed in a home anchored by both a father and a
mother.”32 The statute, therefore, furthers the best interest of
children by placing them in families with adoptive mothers and
fathers, who offer both male and female authority figures, which
is “critical to optimal childhood development and socialization.”33 Because homosexual homes are “necessarily motherless
or fatherless, [they] lack the stability that comes with marriage.”34
In response to the petitioners’ argument that Florida’s ban
on homosexual adoption does not promote the nuclear family
model insomuch as it allows unmarried heterosexuals to adopt,
the court reasoned that the legislature could have rationally
acted on a theory that heterosexual singles are not only more
likely to marry eventually, but are also “better positioned than
homosexual individuals to provide adopted children with education and guidance relative to their sexual development throughout pubescence and adolescence,” because the “children will
need education and guidance after puberty concerning relationships with the opposite sex.”35 Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit
declined to rehear en banc the Lofton case, affirming the constitutionality of the Florida statute.36 The American Civil Liberties
Union subsequently petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for review of the Lofton case on October 1, 2004,37 but the Court denied certiorari in mid-January, 2005.38

TREATMENT OF ADOPTION BY HOMOSEXUALS IN
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
No European nation categorically denies homosexuals the
opportunity to adopt children. Instead, the current discussion
throughout Europe is not whether homosexuals can adopt, but
rather whether gay and lesbian couples should be able to adopt
jointly. Like Florida, many European nations also employ the
“best interest of the child” standard in adoption determinations.
The outcomes, however, of a “best interest of the child” analysis
in Europe often yield a very different result in same sex adoption cases.
24

THE NETHERLANDS
In 2001, The Netherlands legalized same-sex marriage, extending to same-sex couples identical rights, benefits, and burdens associated with marriage. This also included the right to
adopt children.39 Joint adoptions by homosexuals are permitted
under the 2000 amendments to the Dutch Act on Adoption by
Persons of the Same Sex, so long as the requesting individuals
“have been living together during at least three continuous years
immediately before the submission of the request. The request
can be an adopter who is the . . . registered partner or other life
partner of the parent . . .”40 As in Florida, section 1:227(3) of
the Act explicitly requires that the adoption be in the child’s best
interest.41 Even so, one in every thirteen Dutch same-sex couples has adopted children.42
DENMARK
Denmark currently allows joint adoption by same-sex couples.43 Before 1999, however, homosexual couples were not
allowed to adopt children together, regardless of whether it was
the partner’s child or an unrelated child.44 The legislature’s rationale for denying joint adoption was based on a belief that the
child’s best interest required having both a “father” and a
“mother”45 and a fear that least developed countries may be deterred from sending adoptable children to Denmark if same-sex
couples may potentially be the adoptive parents.46
In 1999, however, Denmark lifted its categorical ban on
same-sex couple adoption, realizing a “new understanding of the
phrase the child’s best interest” (emphasis added).47 The Danish
legislature noted that the children affected by the ban had
“inferior legal status compared to that of children in marriage
regarding inheritance rights and in cases in which the partnership dissolved.”48 Moreover, the children had not been safeguarded against the possibility that the parental figure who had
not been legally allowed to adopt could avoid certain legal obligations connected with the child if the partnership ended or the
parent died.49
Because foreign born children represent the large majority
of adoptable children throughout Europe50 and homosexuality is
considered immoral or illegal in their countries of birth,51 it is no
surprise that Denmark still prohibits gays and lesbians from
jointly adopting unrelated children from abroad.52 Same-sex
couples are limited to adoption of their partner’s biological children.53
SPAIN
Spanish law is among the most liberal because both gay and
straight couples can marry and adopt children.54 Until very recently, each of the country’s autonomous communities (regional
groupings of provinces) used its wide executive and legislative
autonomy55 to legislate varying types of adoption law.56 On
June 30, 2005 Spanish Parliament approved57 a bill which extends the Spanish constitutional right to marry to couples of the
same sex, thereby insuring them all the rights previously afforded only heterosexuals.58 The bill cites an increasing social
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acceptance of homosexuality alongside the Constitutional guarantees of nondiscrimination and free personality development in
support of the modifications.59 Among other changes, it
amended the second paragraph of Article 44 of the Spanish Civil
Code to read, “marriage is to have the same requirements and
effects whether both contracting parties be of the same or different sex,”60 including the right to adoption.61

FLORIDA’S TRASH-WORTHY LAW
Florida’s current law is ill-advised for several reasons, all of
which could be remedied by the passage of a bill similar to those
proposed in the Florida senate during the 2005 session.62 Florida’s current statutory law stands alone as the only United
States’ jurisdiction to categorically deny gays and lesbians the
opportunity to adopt, and Florida’s law looks regressive and
discriminatory by other Western nations’ standards. This article’s survey of the current status of same-sex adoption law in
other countries demonstrates that a large number of Western
nations have moved well beyond the question of whether gays
and lesbians should be able to adopt. The contemporary Western world’s question is whether homosexual couples should be
able to adopt jointly. Moreover, the rationales employed by
Florida in the Lofton case are pre-textual, at best.63 It is not in
the best interest of any Floridian child for homosexuals to be
categorically prohibited from adopting.
ORIGINS OF ADOPTED CHILDREN
While “international adoptions comprised approximately
21% of unrelated adoptions in the United States, they comprised
a staggering 96% of unrelated adoptions in Sweden. Statistics
from the Netherlands show an almost identical contrast. Similarly, in Denmark, only 7% of the total adopted children were
born in Denmark.”64 Moreover, European nations fear that allowing gay and lesbian couples to adopt jointly will discourage
least developed countries from sending foreign born children to
Europe, thus severely diminishing the number of adoptions annually.65 This fear is hardly irrational, as the China Center for
Adoption Affairs (CCAA) “recently advised that ‘adoption applications from homosexual families are not acceptable.’”66
Florida, however, does not suffer a native-born-children shortage like Europe does. In 2001 “there were over 3,400 children
in Florida eligible for adoption for whom there were no adoptive
parents available.”67 By putting a categorical ban on adoption
by homosexuals, Florida automatically decreases the number of
its children who will be adopted each year.

legally free and adoptable.70 Rather than statutorily excluding
homosexuals from the potential pool of available parents,71 Florida should be taking steps to remove the barriers that keep waiting children from adoption. This is especially true because no
conclusive evidence establishes that homosexuals are less competent parents.72 “Children raised by parents with a same-sex
orientation are thriving.”73 In fact, the alternative of allowing
children to remain not adopted may have negative developmental impact on children.74 The propriety of removing said barriers
becomes especially important in light of the fact that childrearing by homosexuals is widespread throughout Florida75 and is
on the rise nationwide.76 In 1976, an estimated 300,000 and
500,000 gay and lesbian biological parents had children.77 By
1990, there were between six million to fourteen million children with a gay or lesbian parent, and between eight million to
ten million children being raised in a gay or lesbian household.78
According to the 2000 census, every county in Florida reported
at least one same-sex couple with children under age eighteen in
the household,79 and over 40% of Florida counties have a higher
proportion of same-sex couples with children than the national
average.80
Whether or not these numbers can be extrapolated to other
geographical locations is unimportant. What is significant is
that the European response to modern homosexual parenting
trends, though not perfect, seems more concerned with determining the actual best interests of the child than the Florida approach by allowing homosexuals to adopt children either alone
or jointly.81 For example, one motivation Denmark had in extending joint adoption rights to homosexuals was precisely to
avoid situations in which children raised by gays and lesbians
would be disadvantaged by an inferior legal status because of
the parent’s sexual orientation.82
DISCRIMINATION
Florida’s law is not supported by the state’s purported rationales, and it is discriminatory in such a way that would be
impermissible under foreign and international law. The legislative history of Florida’s ban on homosexual adoption would be
fatal for the bill if it were being proposed before the legislative
body of one of the countries discussed above. Judge Barkett
details the legislative history of § 63.042 in his Lofton dissent,
calling the statute’s enactment a “witch-hunting hysteria more
appropriate to the 17th century than the 20th,” during which
Anita Bryant, one of the law’s biggest advocates, referred to
homosexuals as “human garbage,” among other things.83

THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD

DOMESTIC TRENDS

It may in fact be in the best interest of Floridian children if
homosexuals were not categorically excluded from adopting
them. By changing the standard to a case by case analysis, the
legislation currently pending before Florida’s Senate wisely recognizes that the best interest of the child should be paramount to
prejudice against homosexuals.68 As noted above, Florida is
home to 3,40069 of the approximately 117,000 U.S. children

Despite the burgeoning number of European countries that
allow same-sex couples to adopt jointly, as well as the growing
judicial and legislative mandate internationally that gays and
lesbians should at least be allowed to adopt individually, it is
unlikely that an increased number of jurisdictions in the United
States84 will feel compelled to extend similar adoption opportunities anytime soon. In 2004, eleven American states amended
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their state constitutions to exclude same sex couples from ever
realizing marriage.85 Those states include Kentucky, Oklahoma,
Michigan, Mississippi, Oregon, Ohio, Georgia, Utah, Arkansas,
Montana, and North Dakota.86 In addition, since the federal
Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) became federal law in
1996,87 over thirty-seven states have enacted state versions of
the DOMA,88 which preclude recognition of same sex marriages
performed by another state.89 If anything, these anti-gay marriage provisions create a climate of animus against homosexuals,
which fosters rather than discourages legislation akin to Florida’s statutory ban on homosexual adoption.
Given the fact that the United States Supreme Court has
denied certiorari in the Lofton case,90 and the Florida Supreme
Court has upheld equal protection, due process, and privacy
challenges to the adoption statute,91 few legal alternatives are
left to homosexual Floridians seeking to adopt children. There
is the possibility of amending the Florida Constitution in such a
way as to effectively repeal the anti-gay adoption law or an
amendment as a citizen’s initiative process.92 Given that Floridians have used their initiative process to protect health and
welfare before,93 it is not beyond the realm of possibility to think
that Florida citizens may one day amend their constitution to
protect the best interests of adoptable children by removing barriers to gay adoption.

CONCLUSION
Florida’s statute is inconsistent with the developed world’s
treatment of homosexual adoption. This article exposes the fact
that Florida lags behind other U.S. states, as well as many foreign jurisdictions insomuch as it remains the only state with a
statute categorically banning homosexuals from adopting.
Given the persuasive case made by the past legislative proposals
in the Florida senate and foreign jurisdictions, the Florida legislature should reconsider shutting down future bills attempting to
revise the categorical ban on gay adoption. Instead, it should
revise or eliminate the statutory ban on homosexual adoption,
using the European perspective on the best interest of the child.
Though trends in other Western nations proved of little influence on the final disposition for the Lofton plaintiffs, the Loftons
will hardly be the last gay Floridians seeking to adopt. Florida
would be well advised to pay attention to the best interest of the
child analysis utilized by other countries so that more eligible
Floridian children can be adopted. Instead of allowing the homophobic rhetoric of “human garbage” to permeate Florida law,
lawmakers should strongly consider allowing gays and lesbians
access to adoption.
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OPEN WINDOW:
MATTER OF LOVO’S IMPLICATIONS FOR
TRANSSEXUAL AND IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES
By Grisella Martinez, Esq.*

A

valid marriage was defined under federal law in the
passage of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) in
1996,1 as one between a man and a woman. Many legal advocates recognized this legislation as a door slamming shut
the possibility of legal recognition of same-sex marriages. However, the DOMA failed to define the terms “man” and “woman.”
Presumably this omission occurred because federal legislators
and America’s heterosexual dominant culture did not contemplate scenarios involving men and women who had undergone
sexual reassignment. Congress’ failure to define these terms
opened a window where marriage between a man and a postoperative transsexual woman,2 or vice-versa, could be classified
as a valid marriage under federal law, thereby providing a basis
for conferring immigration and other federal benefits. The
Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) affirmed this basis for
immigration benefits in Matter of Lovo, which firmly established
immigration benefits could be conferred on a spouse in a marriage where the other spouse was a postoperative transsexual.

MATTER OF LOVO: AN OVERVIEW
The BIA3 held in Lovo4 that the DOMA “does not preclude,
for purposes of federal law, recognition of a marriage involving a
postoperative transsexual, where the marriage is considered by
the State in which it was performed as one between two individuals of the opposite sex.” In addition, the BIA held that “a
marriage between a postoperative transsexual and a person of the
opposite sex may be the basis for [spousal immigration] benefits…where the State in which the marriage occurred recognizes
the change in sex of the postoperative transsexual and considers
the marriage a valid heterosexual marriage.” The Immigration
and Nationality Act (“INA”) states that U.S. citizens may file
beneficiary petitions for “alien relatives” who are “immediate
family members.” Immediate family members, who qualify as
“beneficiaries” of a petition, include spouses, as well as parents,
and children. The INA does not define who constitutes a
“spouse” for purposes of immigration law.
The petitioner in Lovo was a postoperative transsexual U.S.
citizen woman who married a male citizen of El Salvador. The
couple wed in North Carolina, and the petitioner subsequently
filed a visa petition for her husband so that he could apply for
lawful permanent resident status and acquire his “green card.”
The petitioner provided the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (“the Service”) with: 1) her North Carolina birth
certificate showing her sex as “female;” 2) an affidavit from her
physician attesting to her sexual reassignment surgery; 3) a
North Carolina court order demonstrating her change of name;
28

4) her North Carolina marriage certificate; and 5) her North
Carolina driver’s license showing her name and her current sex
as a female.
During its investigation, the Service discovered that the Petitioner was born a male in North Carolina, and had undergone
sexual reassignment surgery to become a female. The Service
erroneously denied her visa petition stating that a valid marriage
for purposes of immigration law was a federal question; therefore, her marriage was invalid because it was not between one
man and one woman. The Service found that the beneficiary
was ineligible for immigration benefits as a spouse. The petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to the BIA.
On appeal, the BIA stated that its analysis involved
“determining first whether the marriage is valid under [s]tate law
and then whether the marriage qualifies under the [Immigration
and Nationality] Act.”5 The BIA concluded that under the statutory laws of North Carolina,6 a valid marriage is one between a
male and a female (although these terms were undefined in the
statute) and that the law expressly prohibited same-sex marriages. The BIA also discussed provisions of North Carolina’s
statutes that set forth requirements for amending birth certificates.7 These statutes explicitly permit the changing of an individual’s sex on the birth record after sexual reassignment surgery
and when proof of such surgery is provided from a licensed physician. Based on these facts, the BIA determined that the petitioner and beneficiary had entered into a valid marriage under
the laws of the State of North Carolina.
The BIA next addressed the second issue of whether the
marriage qualified as a valid marriage under current immigration
law. It noted the absence of any language in the INA defining
“spouse” and the failure of the DOMA to elaborate on the definition of “spouse” other than to state that “the word ‘spouse’ refers
only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”8
The BIA also closely examined the failure of the DOMA and
federal law to address the specific issue of postoperative transsexuals entering into marriage. In addressing this failure, the
BIA looked to several sources of statutory construction and interpretation including the text of the DOMA, its legislative history,
and relevant case law.
Citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,9 the BIA followed the well-settled canon of statutory construction that “if the language of the statute is clear and
unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete, as we clearly ‘must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.’”
It found that the legislative history and plain text of the DOMA
clearly applied to marriages between a man and a woman and not
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to same-sex couples. It also found that the House Committee tation and removal proceedings involving transsexual immiConference Report used the terms “same sex” and “homosexual” grants. On a broader scale, this holding is significant because it
interchangeably and repeatedly addressed the repercussions of suggests that other agencies within the federal government may
allowing homosexual couples to marry. The BIA highlighted the recognize the validity of transsexual marriages in conferring fedfact that Congress never addressed the issue of marriage by post- eral benefits on spouses.
operative transsexuals in any legislative proceedings and found
IMMIGRATION BENEFITS
this failure to be remarkable in light of various state statutes recThe full implication of Lovo has yet to be established. To
ognizing transsexual marriage.10 The BIA held that:
date, the Service has not adjudicated Lovo’s petition on remand
[T]he legislative history of the DOMA indicates that
in enacting that statute, Congress only intended to
from the BIA, but in theory, the Service cannot deny the petition
restrict marriages between persons of the same sex.
solely because the petitioner or beneficiary is a transsexual.
There is no indication that the DOMA was meant to
However, this does not preclude the Service from denying the
apply to a marriage involving a postoperative transvisa petition on other grounds. The most relevant example of
sexual where the marriage is considered by the State
this situation is the case of Donita Ganzon (a U.S. citizen Filiin which it was performed as one between two indi11
pino male to female transsexual) and her husband Jiffy Javellana
viduals of the opposite sex.
(a Filipino male immigrant).
Of even greater interest is the
Donita Ganzon immigrated to the
BIA’s conclusion that Congress did not
...in
theory,
the
Service
cannot
United States in the 1970s. In 1981,
intend to overrule long-standing case
she underwent sexual reassignment
law that provides for state dominion in
deny the petition solely because
determining the validity of marriage.
the petitioner or beneficiary is a surgery. Subsequently, she legally
changed her name and sought recogniThe BIA held that the recognition of
transsexual.
tion of her sex change through the Calisuch a marriage deemed valid under
fornia state courts. The state of Califorstate law did not require Congressional
nia issued her a California driver’s license and allowed her to
authorization for the purposes of immigration.12
However, the Service argued against this interpretation and change her nursing license to reflect her sex as female.17 When
asked the BIA to give the terms “man” and “woman,” as used in she became a U.S. citizen six years later, her Certificate of Citithe DOMA, their “common meaning” when evaluating the valid- zenship listed her current name and her sex as female. In addiity of a marriage. Arguing that chromosomal patterns conclu- tion, the United States State Department issued her a passport
sively established “sex” because of their immutability, the Ser- which listed her sex as female.
vice contended that females with XX chromosomes and males
In 2000, Ms. Ganzon met Jiffy Javellana in the Philippines.
with XY chromosomes could never change their sex, even if they Approximately one year later she filed a fiancé visa for him with
underwent sexual reassignment surgery. The BIA rejected this legacy INS18 and he entered the United States. They married in
argument, citing the great debate within the medical community Nevada a few months later.19 During their interview with the
concerning determinations of an individual’s sex.13
Service for Mr. Javellana’s green card, Ms. Ganzon revealed that
Additionally, the BIA also recognized that not all individu- she was a transsexual. Shortly thereafter, the Service denied her
als are born with strictly XX or XY chromosomes and that “[a] husband’s application for permanent resident status based on the
chromosomal pattern [was] not always the most accurate deter- invalidity of his marriage to Ms. Ganzon. The couple filed suit
mination of an individual’s gender.”14 Furthermore, the BIA in U.S. District Court for the Western Division of California20
declared an individual’s original birth certificate did not provide seeking a declaratory judgment against the Department of Homean accurate method for determining gender. The “incongruities” land Security. While the suit was pending, Mr. Javellana filed a
and “ambiguities” in medical criteria for determining a person’s second application for adjustment of status and hoped that the
sex using purely physical markers at birth supported this find- BIA’s ruling in Lovo would preclude the Service from denying
ing.15 The BIA ended its analysis by reaffirming its position him a green card based on the alleged invalidity of his marriage
that, “for immigration purposes,” it is appropriate to use a cur- to a transsexual. In October 2005, the Service d5enied Mr. Javellana’s application “in the exercise of discretion,” stating that
rent birth certificate “to determine an individual’s gender.”16
Ms. Ganzon and Mr. Javellana had failed to prove that they enRECOGNITION OF THE ABILITY TO CONFER IMMIGRATION tered into their marriage in good faith and that the marriage was
BENEFITS ON A TRANSSEXUAL SPOUSE AS A TWO-FOLD “bona fide.”21
PRECEDENT
This case illustrates how future effects of Lovo have yet to
be
realized
in the context of visa petitions and adjustment appliLovo raises many issues, not only for the transsexual immigrant community, but the greater transsexual community at large. cations. It remains to be seen whether the Service will grant the
The primary importance of the BIA’s holding is that the Depart- petition or deny it on another “discretionary” ground. Regardment of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice are less of the outcome, Lovo endures as precedent in immigration
bound by this precedent in adjudicating visa petitions and depor- law and potentially allows transsexual spouses to claim immigraSpring 2006
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tion benefits in other contexts aside from family-based visa petitions. Under Lovo, the opportunities for transsexual spouses to
claim immigration benefits extend to employment-based visa
petitions, non-immigrant visa petitions, asylum applications, and
deportation and removal proceedings.
For example, aliens sponsored for an immigrant visa by a
United States employer may also file for derivative permanent
resident status for their spouses and children. Again, as with
family-based immigrant visas, there is no definition of “spouse”
and the couple need only prove that they entered into a valid and
bona fide marriage. Lovo also potentially applies to visa petitions for non-immigrants. This includes applicants for student
visas, employment visas, diplomatic visas, and other special
non-immigrant visa categories. As long as a benefit is given to
the visa holder’s spouse it could appropriately be considered
under the BIA’s ruling. Likewise, an alien filing for asylum, if
granted, may also pass on benefits to qualifying “derivatives.”22
In the case of a spouse, the only requirement for the spouse to
receive benefits based on asylum (such as permanent resident
status) is that the asylee married their spouse prior to receiving a
grant of asylum.
In deportation and removal proceedings,23 an immigrant
may request various forms of relief from removal based on marriage to a U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident. For example,
when an “out-of-status”24 alien has continuously remained in the
United States for over ten years, the alien may request cancellation of removal based on “extreme hardship” to the U.S. citizen
or legal permanent resident spouse. Again, the statutes and
regulations25 discussing cancellation of removal do not define
“spouse” nor do they impose any other prerequisites on the marriage, other than it be bona fide. Therefore, it is possible, under
Lovo, that a transsexual spouse could claim or confer the benefit
of marriage as a basis for relief from removal.
To better illustrate this point, imagine the following: a U.S.
citizen male to female transsexual legally marries a male immigrant who is out-of-status. He has resided in the United States
continuously for over ten years prior to the commencement of
his removal proceedings. They have two adopted minor U.S.
citizen children, but have no other immediate or extended family
members in the United States. The U.S. citizen wife does not
work and the husband is the sole source of financial income for
the entire family. They own real property together and various
other assets. Under this set of facts, the Immigration Court is
bound by the determination of the BIA in Lovo to allow the husband to apply for cancellation of removal based on extreme
hardship to his U.S. citizen spouse and children. Although the
grant of the application is still a discretionary decision made by
the immigration judge, the husband could not be precluded from
applying for cancellation of removal before the Court based on
an “invalid” transsexual marriage. In addition, if the judge denies the application, the husband could appeal to the BIA, which
would have the power to remand the case to the Immigration
Court for a decision consistent with its holding in Lovo.
Therefore, the extent to which the BIA’s holding in Lovo
30

affects transsexual spouses has yet to manifest before the Service or the Immigration Court. The uncertainties involved in the
ability of transsexual spouses to confer benefits as U.S. citizens
or to receive them as immigrants has great potential for litigation in federal courts and before administrative agency adjudicatory bodies.
FEDERAL BENEFITS
If the DOMA does not preclude a transsexual spouse from
conferring an immigration benefit on their legal spouse, then it
follows that it would not preclude any transsexual spouse from
conferring any federal benefit on their legal spouse. This conclusion stems from the implication, drawn from Lovo, that a
valid marriage under state law where a spouse is transsexual
may serve as the basis for receiving or conferring federal benefits on the other spouse, regardless of the DOMA.
The arena of federal health benefits is a prime example of
the potential benefits for married couples. The federal government currently employs more than two million people.26 The
Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”), the self-proclaimed
“human resources agency” of the government is responsible for
administering the Federal Employees Health Benefit Program
(“FEHB”) and several other benefits programs.27
Under the FEHB Program, federal employees and their family members are eligible for health coverage. The enacting statute for the FEHB states that a “‘member of family’ means the
spouse of an employee” as well as certain categories of children.28 The statute does not provide a definition of the term
“spouse.” The accompanying regulation offers no further clarification other than to state that the term “member of family” has
the meaning set forth in the statute given above.29 Aside from
the applicable statute and regulations, the only other source of
guidance is the FEHB Handbook which reiterates that “[f]amily
members eligible for coverage under your self and family enrollment are your spouse (including a valid common law marriage
[in accordance with applicable state law]) and children.”30
There are no publicized cases where a federal employee
attempted to confer health benefits on a transsexual spouse or
where a transsexual federal employee attempted to confer benefits on a spouse. There is no reliable data on how many transsexuals are residing in the United States,31 but probability dictates that someone will inevitably raise a claim based on the
ability to confer federal benefits to a spouse, in which one of the
parties is a transsexual. The OPM does have an adjudicatory
board (the Merit System Protection Board) for handling various
administrative issues, but they do not review health benefit issues.32 Under the FEHB’s enacting statute “[t]he district courts
of the United States have original jurisdiction, concurrent with
the United States Court of Federal Claims, of a civil action or
claim against the United States[.]”33 Therefore, the federal employee would have the right to file an action against the government in federal court immediately.
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CONCLUSION
Lovo opens the door to analyzing multiple types of potential
“federal benefits” conferred on transsexual spouses, including,
but not limited to, Social Security, tax and veterans benefits.
However, the factual dynamics of Lovo are very narrow and
may raise other issues that potentially complicate the rights of
those who do not fall into the same category. This is because
Lovo did not contemplate the numerous other possible permutations of transsexual marriage. The BIA did not identify the possible outcomes if both spouses had been transsexuals. It also did
not take into account for the marriage of a transsexual woman to
a biological man.34 Nor did it consider the applicability of its
ruling to transsexuals trying to confer benefits but whom were
unable to legally change their sex, were married in states that

did not legally recognize changes of sex, or were already married prior to having sexual reassignment surgery. Therefore,
while the BIA clearly recognized that there were potentially
“anomalous results” in refusing to recognize legal changes of
sex, the BIA did not fully address the consequences of its holding on a broader scale.35
In the final analysis, Lovo is an important and precedential
case not only in the immigration context, but also as a step forward for the transsexual community as a whole. Although the
DOMA closed an important door for the lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and transgendered community, the BIA’s holding in Lovo seems
to have opened a window in the fight for transsexual rights. It
will take time and litigation in both the administrative and judicial arenas to determine exactly how far these rights extend.
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UNDER GRACE:1 LEGAL ISOLATION AND THE
CHILDREN OF THE OLD ORDER AMISH

L

By Jennifer Lavoie*

argely defined by their isolation, the Amish have carved abiding people, which afford the Amish certain legal exempout pockets in which self-policing communities shun tions. Some exemptions, such as their exemption from Social
intrusion and view modernity as contrary to their Security, affect Amish children only tangentially. Others didogma. Born into these insular communities, most children of rectly affect Amish children, such as the Supreme Court decision
the Old Order Amish will know only a Plain2 life. This life en- in Yoder, which permitted Amish parents to withhold education
tails simplicity in worship, dress, lifestyle, and work. Amish from their children.14
parents’ religious beliefs dictate what experiences or practices
In 1968, several Amish parents were convicted for failing to
are acceptable and few Amish children stray from such restric- send their children to school. Although Wisconsin requires edutions.3 Because of their idiosyncratic isolation, the Amish have cation to the age of sixteen, their tradition was to educate chilbeen granted exceptions from certain laws,4 and the seclusion dren only to the eighth grade. More education, they argued,
inherent to Amish life impedes the enforcement of others. These caused arrogance, as it elevated an individual’s intellectual interfactors converge to create unique legal issues for Amish chil- ests over their community involvement and constituted a deterrent to salvation.15 Another reason cited when Amish parents
dren.
For the Amish, religion is not simsought exemption for their children
ply professed, but lived; every action is
from mandatory attendance requireFor the Amish, religion is not
devotional. Sins, even otherwise lements was that exposure to modern
gally punishable acts, are confessed to simply professed, but lived; every
culture in high school would introduce
God before the entire community.
an unacceptable value system at a critiaction is devotional. Sins, even
Once forgiveness has been sought, the
cal stage of development.16 As one
otherwise legally punishable
5
issue is deemed resolved. To confront
Lancaster woman argued, “The more
acts,
are
confessed
to
God
before
they know, the more apt they are to
someone with a matter that they bethe entire community.
leave.”17
lieve is only between God and the sinner is itself, a separate sin. TransgresThe Supreme Court determined that
sions against God or the community are punished through compulsory attendance requirements unduly burdened the parmeidung, or public shunning.6 Although this, too, varies in se- ents’ free exercise of religion.18 Since everything the Amish do
verity depending on the group—some treat it as a mere formal- or refrain from doing is dictated by their religious beliefs, activiity, while others enforce the ban as absolute—the temporary ex- ties that would otherwise be secular became religious obsercommunication can mean up to six weeks of no social contact vances. Justice Burger also noted that few, if any, other sects or
whatsoever.7 Shunning is meant to be redemptive; those who religions could successfully make such an argument.19 The decihave broken their baptismal vows are isolated until they have sion in Yoder represents only the fifth time the Supreme Court
atoned for their sin.8
granted a free exercise exception beyond those protected by the
Thus, Amish children do not avail themselves of the protec- speech clause.20
tions of the State. Not only are they often unaware of laws inThe Supreme Court previously held that a religious convictended to protect them, but if they become aware, they rarely tion does not nullify the state’s authority within a family unit and
report violations.9 Child labor laws, for example, are not a con- explicitly permitted legal restriction of a parent’s rights in areas
sideration in Amish communities. According to Amish tradition, such as child labor or mandatory school attendance,21 yet the
children are trained and supervised until competent.10 Working Yoder decision stands. Thus the state’s compelling interest in the
on a rural farm can be dangerous, and even though care is taken, education of Amish children is subsumed by their parents’ conthe Amish do not prohibit children from participation in hazard- stitutionally-protected religious beliefs. Yoder is so fact-specific
ous employment. Children injured do not report violations be- to the Amish that it would be of little precedential value for other
cause they are taught that the community resolves issues, and religious groups,22 but opens the door for further exceptions, if
they are loath to become an informant against their families. In the Amish choose to claim them.
1998, responding to fines for labor violations, the Amish sought
Even so, the Amish are hardly a litigious group poised to
11
a Congressional exemption from child labor laws. A bill was exploit their unique circumstances. In the decades since Yoder,
there has not been a rush of policy-changing suits. Yet no group,
subsequently signed into law in 2004.12
State intrusion into Amish affairs is infrequent. Officials are however quaint, is immune from problems. When such probalerted to problems only rarely and experience considerable re- lems arise, it is perhaps inevitable that a self-policing group that
sistance during investigations.13 Moreover, the public perception perceives “the force of law as contrary to the Christian spirit”23
of the Amish is that of an idiosyncratic but peaceful and law- will present significant and troubling deviations from the law.
32
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The most striking example of a harmful deviation from the know.40 Even if their attacker is convicted and imprisoned,
legal protection within Amish sects is the communities’ response many victims must accept their rapist back into the congregation
to sexual assault. Although it may contradict the popular idea of upon release.41 With their community united in silencing them,
Amish lives as ones of idyllic simplicity, there are problems of and the state unwilling to interfere in the sphere of “The Gentle
statutory rape, child molestation, and incest within these insular People,”42 young victims of sexual abuse truly have nowhere to
communities. Local shelters and counseling centers have had to turn.
tailor education programs to target victims who rarely, if ever,
It would be unfair to characterize the entirety of Amish socienter schools or hospitals where such assaults might be recog- ety by the actions of a few. Many Amish single out childrearing
nized.24
as the single most important aspect of their life and entire comThe problems common to prosecuting sexual battery charges munities participate in preparing children for adulthood.43 Even
are exacerbated in the Amish community. Reports of rape are those who leave the church acknowledge that Amish life is fuldiscouraged in Amish communities.25 When charges are filed, filling for most born into it.44
entire villages refuse to cooperate with investigations,26 and witThe decision to abandon their heritage is a harrowing one,
27
nesses are ordered not to testify. One investigating officer la- yet some Amish do so for the sake of their children. Genetic
mented, "The moment we approach them as police, they shut up, disorders, in particular, are common among the Amish—a result
the whole clan."28 Victims find little support or opportunity for of centuries of intermarriage.45 When their children are ill and
recovery and are punished for making their experiences public.29
treatment is available and conflicts with the ordnung, some parCircumstances are even more dire for those who report sex- ents must choose between their children and their religion. Iva
ual abuse while still minors. When Anna Slabaugh, 13, reported Byler left her community, her husband, and her two healthy adult
her brothers were raping her, adults in her community threatened children so that she might obtain treatment for her three youngest
and beat her. Even when, as punishment for coming forward, daughters who were stricken with a rare crippling disease with
Anna’s mother and an Amish man removed all her teeth, Anna no known name or cure.46
was never taken into protective custody.30 Browbeaten into reAnanius and Delia Stutzman chose to remain in their reliscinding the accusations, she eventually ran away from her com- gious community when their daughter, Mary, was diagnosed
with leukemia. The Stutzmans believed the illness was God’s
munity.31
Similarly, Mary Byler, who until recently was a member of will. They would have preferred to keep her at home with their
an Amish community in Wisconsin, was raped by her older cous- six other children, administer homeopathic remedies, and try to
ins and brothers from the time she was six until she turned sev- keep her comfortable until death—which doctors estimated to be
enteen.32 When she sought help from her mother and clergy, she only weeks or months away, if she remained untreated. Instead,
a Michigan judge ordered that Mary
was rebuffed with instructions to fight
receive a spinal tap and chemotherapy.
and pray harder. Her neighbors blamed
With treatment, doctors testified, she
Mary for her brothers’ actions and she Victims must choose between aidstood a 65% chance of surviving to
was forbidden to discuss the subject.
ing
in
the
cover-up
of
their
own
middle age.47
She was told, “He says he’s sorry and
assault or banishment and losing
you have to forgive him.”33 When
The Stutzmans objected to modern
contact with everyone they know. medical treatment for Mary on the
Mary finally filed a police report, her
grounds that it was excessively intrubrothers were arrested. One eventually
sive, destroyed healthy cells along with
was sentenced to eight years in prison;
the other received ten years of probation, with one year of nights the bad, and presumed to contravene God’s will.48 Not all
spent in county jail.34
Amish reject Western medicine, although their use of it remains
At Mary’s rapists’ sentencing, a large contingent of friends selective.49 The complexity of treatment, or use of electricity, is
and family showed up to support the young men35 who had al- not at issue. Rather, they emphasize that although medicines
ready served their Amish punishment of shunning.36 Mary, for may help the ill, only God can heal.50 Amish parents do seek
her part, may no longer contact her family or childhood friends; preventative medicine for their children, though not to the extent
her church voted unanimously to excommunicate her.37 Soon that mainstream Americans utilize medical care.51
after Mary filed her report two more women from her church
In People v. Pierson,52 the Court of Appeals of New York
38
came forward to report their own cases of assault.
found a man who believed disease should be cured only by diIn another case, Norman Byler molested several of his vine intervention criminally liable for the death of his daughter.
daughters and granddaughters over the course of three decades. The Supreme Court held that the right to practice religion freely
He was eventually prosecuted and sentenced to five years in does not include the liberty to expose the community or a child
prison, but despite the terms of his release, was returned to the to disease, ill health, or death;53 parents must safeguard both sosame family members he molested.39
ciety and their children. Nevertheless, Amish children are less
Victims must choose between aiding in the cover-up of their likely to be vaccinated than their counterparts.54
own assault or banishment and losing contact with everyone they
Although no religious tenets specifically forbid vaccines,
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most Amish parents choose not to immunize their children.55 In
1979, America’s last significant polio outbreak swept through
Amish communities in Iowa, Wisconsin, Missouri, and Pennsylvania.56 At that time, the Amish were almost entirely unvaccinated. Many sought immunizations, yet five more cases of
polio were detected in a Minnesota community in 2005.57 Public
health officials traveled door-to-door, seeking permission to test
for the disease and entreating people to vaccinate. Nevertheless,
fewer than twenty children were vaccinated of a two hundredperson village.58
Although the faith itself is not founded upon the absence of
conveniences, the culture created by the Amish is so bound to
religious observances that Amish belief and Amish life are indistinguishable. Thus, under the free exercise clause, both receive
protection. Consequently, the Amish exist not only outside the
modern world, but outside its laws, as well.

Perhaps any inherent inequality in the enforcement of laws
is preferable to the alternative. Any attempt to remedy disparities may spawn new, equally troubling problems. Certainly the
importance of free exercise should be clear. Applying religious
freedom to all but the Amish would be an even more problematic
exception than what currently exists.
While some Amish would argue that intrusion through more
regulation or enforcement could end the Amish way of life,
surely some issues are remediable, without mortally wounding
Amish existence. Mere tradition need not subrogate the wellbeing of Amish children. Strict enforcement of child labor laws
could be economically disastrous for the Amish, but engaging
children in hazardous activities is not fundamental to a Plain life.
Blaming the victim and concealing sexual battery is neither desirable nor a central feature of a religious community.
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LEGISLATIVE UPDATES
By Eriade Hunter*
H. R. 288 Civil Rights Amendments Act of 2005
Introduced by Representative Towns (D-NY)
This bill will amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
Fair Housing Act to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and will be known as the “Civil Rights Amendments Act of 2005.” The amendment contains the same text of
the original Acts protecting people from being discriminated
against, but substitutes the words “religion” and “color” with
“affectional or sexual orientation.”
H. R. 40 Commission to Study Reparation Proposals for
African-Americans Act
Introduced by Representatives Conyers (D-MI), Brown (DFL), Clay (D-MO), Davis (D-IL), Jackson-Lee (D-TX), Lee
(D-CA), Meek (D-FL), Nadler (D-NY), Olver (D-MA), Payne
(D-NJ), Rush (D-IL), Thompson (D-MS), Waters (D-CA),
Watt (D-NC), Jackson (D-IL), McDermott (D-WA), Meeks
(D-NY), Millender-McDonald (D-CA), Norton (D-DC-AL),
Owens (D-NY), Rangel (D-NY), Schakowsky (D-IL), Towns
(D-NY), and Watson (D-CA).
This bill acknowledges the abhorrent nature of the slavery
as it existed in the United States and aims to establish a commission to evaluate the subsequent discrimination against AfricanAmericans and to make recommendations to the Congress on
possible reforms. The purpose of this Act is to “examine the
lingering negative effects of the institution of slavery” and decide if any formal apology is needed or any form of compensation to the descendants of the African slaves is fitting.
H. R. 286 Medicaid Obesity Treatment Act of 2005
Introduced by Representative Towns (D-NY)
This bill intends to require the states that provide Medicaid
prescription coverage to cover drugs medically necessary to treat
obesity. Deaths related to obesity are the second leading cause
of death in the U.S. and the prevalence of obesity in children is
nearly twice what it was in the 1980s. This is particularly troublesome as childhood obesity continues into adulthood and increases the risk of other serious diseases. Gender, age, race,
ethnicity, and income create variances in risk factors for many of
these diseases. For instance, there are overweight people in all
segments of the population, but obesity is more common in Hispanic, African American, Native American, and Pacific Islander
women. Overweight people often are victims of discrimination
and thus, psychological stress and reduced income.

S. 2160 Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders Higher
Education Enhancement Act
Introduced by Senator Boxer (D-CA)
This bill aims to amend the Higher Education Act of 1965
to include Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders. The Asian
American and Pacific Islanders are an extremely diverse population due to the existence of varying ethnicities, immigration patterns, historical experiences, and social group issues. Census
figures record that there are seventeen ethnic groups considered
as Asian and four considered as Pacific Islander. Despite acknowledging these differences, educational programs and policies are based on aggregated data that assumes Asian Americans
and Pacific Islanders are a homogenous group, neglecting the
differences in level of education attained by subgroups within
the larger group. The diverse cultural, linguistic, socioeconomic, and historical experiences affect educational levels.
In addition, the predominating “model minority myth”
negatively affects many youth who are incorrectly perceived as
being academically superior and thus, not needing educational
support services. Only 12.6% of the total Asian Americans and
Pacific Islander population lives in poverty which masks the
disparity contained within the group. For instance, 25% of Vietnamese Americans, 63.6% of Hmong Americans, 42.6% of
Cambodian Americans, 34.7% of Laotian Americans, and 17.7%
of Pacific Islanders live in poverty. These statistics are inextricably linked with educational attainment as only 13.8% of Vietnamese Americans, 5.8% of Laotian Americans, 6.1% of Cambodian Americans, less than 5.1% of Hmong Americans, and
only 13.8% of Pacific Islanders had college degrees.
H. RES. 367 Condemning bigotry, violence, and discrimination against Iranian-Americans.
Introduced by Representatives Meehan (D-MA), Shays (RCT), Mica (R-FL), and Feeney (R-FL).
This resolution urges all levels of law enforcement officials
to aggressively prosecute crimes committed against Iranian
Americans as a result of their national origin or ethnicity. Iranian Americans have been subjected to an increased number of
arrests followed by extended arbitrary detentions without
charges, denials of access to counsel, and abuse by prison guards
in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. Additionally, since
September 11, there has been a massive surge in the number of
discriminatory crimes directed towards Americans of Middle
Eastern descent, including Iranian Americans.

* Eriade Hunter is a first-year law student at American University Washington College of Law and staff writer for The Modern American.
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